

# THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP AND TERRORISM IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES SEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THREAT AND RESPONSE

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
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### **About the Author**

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Source: [http://www.intenseherp.com/images/Draco\\_bimaculatus\\_map.jpg](http://www.intenseherp.com/images/Draco_bimaculatus_map.jpg)

## INTRODUCTION

On 1 August 2006, the Philippine government launched the “Oplan Ultimatum” as a counter-terrorism offensive of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in the Southern Philippines against the terrorist threat posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Around 6,000 government were deployed to Jolo, Sulu where ASG’s chieftain Khadaffy Janjalani was believed to be hiding along with two known operatives of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), namely Dulmatin and Omar Patek who are implicated in the 2002 Bali bombing.

In January 2007, the AFP confirmed the death of Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sulaiman (Jainal Antel Sali, Jr.) as a result of this military offensive. Despite the killing of its key leaders and the reduction of its strength, the AFP still considers the ASG as the number 1 “terrorist threat” in the Philippines because of its continuing “intent” and “capability” to wreak havoc. In fact, the ASG is currently being led by Yasser Igasan, a more militant and aggressive leader who can reinvigorate the Islamic fundamentalist struggle of the ASG. Igasan’s wide experience in community organizing and resource mobilization, serious Islamic training and education, and strong linkages with the Islamic militants in the Middle East and the rouge elements of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) can make him the “reincarnation” of the ASG founder, Abdurajak Janjalani.



Yasser Igasan: The Current ASG Amir

Seven years after 9/11, the Philippine government is still agonizing with the threat posed by the ASG. Despite the military offensives, the ASG continues to menace local peace and order, Philippine national security and even regional stability because of its reported links with JI, considered to be “Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia.”<sup>1</sup> Some good reports and studies have already been written about the ASG with the objective of understanding the threat posed by the group and how to counter this threat.<sup>2</sup> But compared with other armed groups in the

Philippines like the New People's Army (NPA), the MNLF and the MILF, scholarly studies on the ASG is still very limited.

This paper aims to examine terrorist threats posed by the ASG seven years after 9/11. It describes the nature and origin of the ASG, its organizational leadership dynamics, its strength and capabilities and linkages with other terrorist groups operating in the Southern Philippines. This chapter also describes Philippine government response against terrorist threats in the Southern Philippines and concludes with a commentary on what has worked and could have been done better to reduce the threat of terrorism in the Philippines.

### **NATURE AND THE ORIGIN OF THE ASG<sup>3</sup>**

There is no uniform view of the ASG. The United States has listed the ASG in its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) while the United Nations has designated it as one of the three terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia along with Al Qaeda and the JI.<sup>4</sup> Some regard the ASG as part of the international fundamentalist movement, linked to Osama bin Laden, which aims to establish an independent Islamic state in the Philippines.<sup>5</sup> Others see the ASG as the agent provocateur of the Philippine military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) while the Philippine government continues to condemn the ASG as a mere bandit gang, which aims to amass funds through kidnap-for-ransom, extortion and other criminal activities.<sup>6</sup> But its members and sympathizers claim that the ASG represents the legitimate desire of all Muslim resistant groups in the Philippines aiming to establish a separate Islamic state

There is also no uniform account of the origin of the ASG. It has a very nebulous beginning.<sup>7</sup> Existing literatures regard Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani as the founder of ASG. But many works have failed to discuss the real intention of Janjalani when he organized the said group. To elaborate his real motive in establishing the ASG amidst various speculations about the nature and objectives of the said organization, Janjalani issued an undated public proclamation, presumably written between 1993 and 1994, which aptly stressed what he called the "Four Basic Truths" about the ASG, to wit:

1. It is not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle which is against the teaching of Islam, especially the Quran, but to serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and MNLF whose revolutionary roles and leadership cannot be ignored or usurped;

2. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a purely Islamic government whose “nature, meaning, emblem and objective” are basic to peace;
3. Its advocacy of war is necessity for as long as there exist oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslims; and,
4. It believes that “war disturbs peace only for the attainment of the true and real objective of humanity – the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the noble Quran and the purified sunnah.”<sup>8</sup>

Understanding the origin of ASG cannot be completed without a full grasp of Janjalani’s background and the socio-economic-political-cultural context of Muslim radicalism in the Philippines. Though many scholarly works have been published about the origin of Muslim radicalism in the Philippines,<sup>9</sup> the life and political philosophy of Janjalani, however, have not been deeply understood by some scholars and policy-makers. In fact, there is only one scholarly, albeit very brief, work describing the life and political philosophy of Janjalani, which can provide the academic and policy-making community initial insights on the ideological aspect of the ASG.<sup>10</sup>

According to the various intelligence briefings of the AFP, the formation of the ASG could be traced from the disgruntled members of the MNLF over the dormant secessionist movement in the late 1970s.<sup>11</sup> Khadaffy Janjalani claimed that the ASG was officially founded in 1993 with the name *Al-Harokatul Islamiyyah*.<sup>12</sup> But experts and policy makers were not certain if the ASG referred to a formal organization or just an informal network of like-minded Filipino secessionist leaders and Muslim radicals. Peter Kreuzer argued that because the ASG was composed of various autonomous Muslim groups, it was a mere alliance rather than a formal organization.<sup>13</sup> What was certain was the fact that Janjalani used the non-de guerre *Abu Sayyaf* in most of his writings to honor an Afghan resistance leader and Islamic professor, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. The Wahabi theology of Professor Sayyaf greatly influenced Janjalani’s concept of an Islamic state. Janjalani formed the movement to propagate his fanatical belief of an Islamic state in the Southern Philippines.

Despite the nebulous origin of the ASG, the military establishment believed that in 1990, Janjalani formed the Mujahideed Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) to wage *jihād* against the Philippine government for the establishment of an independent Islamic state in the Southern Philippines. The Philippine military regarded the MCFF as the forerunner of the ASG. When the

MCFF attracted some “hard core” followers in Basilan, Zulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga, it was later called as the ASG.

But according to Noor Muog, one of the key leaders of the ASG now under police custody, the MCFF was a misnomer. The forerunner of the ASG was the *Jamaa Tableegh*, a Islamic propagation group established in Basilan in the early 1980s by Abdurajak Janjalani. This group conducted seminars, symposia and small-group discussions to propagate Islam. It was also through this group where Abdurajak delivered some of his Islamic discourses. Because of charismatic lectures of Abdurajak, the *Jamaa Tableegh* received popularity not only in Basilan but also in Zamboanga and Jolo.<sup>14</sup> The involvement of some of its followers in anti-government rallies prompted the military to put the group under surveillance. Key followers of *Jamaa Tableegh* formed the nucleus of the ASG, which Abdurajak Janjalani initially called *Al-Harakatul Al-Islmiyah* (AHAI) or the Islamic Movement.

The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) tagged the ASG as a terrorist organization when it claimed responsibility for the bombing of M/V Doulos in Zamboanga City in 1991. The M/V Doulos was a Christian missionary ship docked at the Zamboanga port. According to the Southern Command of the AFP, it was in 1991 when the name ASG was first publicly used by Janjalani in connection with the bombing of M/V Doulos.<sup>15</sup> The ASG gained international notoriety on 20 May 1992 when it assassinated Fr. Salvatore Carzedda, an Italian missionary working in Zamboanga City. These two major events prompted some observers to conclude that the ASG was founded sometime in 1991-1992.<sup>16</sup>

But a recent study states that the ASG first emerged in 1989.<sup>17</sup> Based on existing records of the AFP and the PNP, Janjalani renamed the ASG as AHAI in 1994 to receive international funding and support. According to Philippine intelligence reports, the AHAI drew its support from the extremist element in Iran (Hezbollah), Pakistan (Jamaat-Islami and Hizbul-Mujahideen), Afghanistan (Hizb-Islami) Egypt (Al Gamaa-Al-Islamiya), Algeria (Islamic Liberation Front) and Libya (International Harakatul Al-Islamia). The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) was also known to have provided financial support to AHAI. Because of repeated media reports, the name ASG became more popular than the AHAI. Western sources, however, tend to use and even interchange both names.<sup>18</sup> But original members of the ASG preferred to use AHAI to describe their group.

Though Janjalani was a known *mujahideen* by its followers, his reputation of being a veteran of Afghan War is now being challenged. There is no evidence showing that he actually fought in the Afghan War. There was no doubt,

however, that he was a charismatic and serious Muslim scholar who, ironically, attended high school in Claret College, a Catholic-run school in the Basilan capital of Isabela. Janjalani also received a very good Islamic education in Saudi Arabia in 1981 and was sent to *Ummu I-Qura* in Mecca where he seriously studied Islamic jurisprudence for almost three years.<sup>19</sup> He was later attracted deeply to the concept of *jihad* when he conscientiously studied in Pakistan the history and politics of Islamic revolution. Heavily armed with Islamic thoughts, Janjalani went back to his homeland in Basilan in 1984 to preach in various mosques.

While formally establishing the ASG, Janjalani became an avid preacher to limited audiences in Santa Barbara *madrassah* in Zamboanga City in the early 1990s. During his preaching, Janjalani openly released different theological statements and public proclamations revealing his deep grasp of Islamic religion, particularly the Wahabi Islamic theology. Wahabism brands other Muslim sects as heretical. Janjalani delivered at least eight discourses or *Khutbah* within a radical framework based on the Quranic concept of *Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah* (the fighting and dying for the cause of Islam).<sup>20</sup> To advance his fanatical belief, Janjalani convinced some Muslim leaders in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi- Tawi, Zamboanga City and General Santos City to join the *Juma'a Abu Sayyap* movement, now rendered in English as the ASG. Most of his recruits were disgruntled members of the MNLF and the MILF. When Janjalani attended a Islamic course in Tripoli, Libya in 1987, he met like-minded Muslim Filipino students who eventually helped Janjalani to form the ASG. These students had common remorse against the Philippine government based in Manila and against "heretic" leadership of the MNLF and the MILF. Many scholars and journalists mistranslated ASG to mean "bearer of the sword".<sup>21</sup> But ASG really means in Arabic, "Father of the Swordsman".<sup>22</sup>

### **ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF THE ASG<sup>23</sup>**


When Janjalani formed the ASG, his original vision was to form a highly organized, systematic, and disciplined organization of fanatical secessionist Islamic fighters in the Southern Philippines.<sup>24</sup> Janjalani recruited younger and more passionate Muslim leaders who studied Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and Egypt. These young Muslim leaders had common remorse against the MNLF, which entered into peace agreement with the Philippine government in 1996. These leaders also shared common anger against the Philippine government based in Manila. To achieve his vision of a truly organized Muslim resistant group in the Philippines, Janjalani deliberately made a detailed organization of the ASG.<sup>25</sup> He formed the Islamic Executive Council (IEC) composed of fifteen Amirs. Janjalani chaired the IEC to serve as the main planning and execution body of ASG. Under the IEC were two special



committees. The first committee was the *Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh* Group in charged of fund raising and Islamic education. The second committee was the *Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee* in charged of agitation and propaganda activities.<sup>26</sup>

The ASG also established a military arm called *Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah* whose members came predominantly from disgruntled members of MNLF and the MILF. This military arm had three main units to carryout all terrorist activities of the ASG: the Demolition Team, the Mobile Force Team and the Campaign Propaganda Team. The Demolition Team composed mostly of trained fighters, had the capability to manufacture its own mines and explosives used in the bombing operations of the group. The Mobile Force Team - composed mostly of affiliates of radio clubs, traders, businessmen, shippers, and professionals - was in charged of collaboration and coordination activities of the ASG. The Campaign Propaganda Team - composed of professionals, students, and businessmen - was in charged of gathering vital information necessary to carry out the mission of *Mujahidden Al-Sharifullah*.<sup>27</sup> Figure 1 is the organizational structure of the ASG as originally envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani.

**Figure 1. ASG Organization Envisioned by the A. Janjalani**



Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

The most important body organized by Abdurajak Janjalani inside the ASG is the *Majlis Shura*, a consultative assembly shaping the internal and external activities of the ASG. It was during the First Assembly of *Majlis Shura* in 1994 when the name *Al-Harakatul Al-Islmiyah* was officially adopted. Among the original members of the *Majlis Shura* were leaders very close to Abdurajak

Janjalani namely Radulan Sahiron, Mohammad Hataa Haipe, Anwar Abubakar, Asmad Abdul and Jovenal Bruno.

But the original organizational set-up of ASG was short-lived and was never revived. When the combined forces of the PNP and the AFP killed Janjalani in a bloody encounter in December 1998 in Lamitan, Basilan, the ASG suffered a severe leadership vacuum. This led to the discontentment of some of its original members. The organization set-up by Janjalani crumbled rapidly with him. The IEC headed by Janjalani also suffered an untimely demise. With no overall Amir at the helm of the organization, every faction of the ASG went on its own and the group became a mere network of various armed groups with their own respective Amirs commanding their own respective loyal followers operating mainly in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi.

With the death of Abdurajak Janjalani, remaining leaders, however, reluctantly selected Khadafy Janjalani, a younger brother, as his successor in July 1999. But the ASG under Khadaffy Janjalani had lost its original organization set-up and Islamic theological zeal. Unlike the older Janjalani, the younger Janjalani did not have the theological passion of his brother. Lacking strong ideological guide, most of its members resorted to banditry, piracy, kidnap-for-ransom, and other terrorist activities. The ASG was also heavily factionalized. Khadaffy Janjalani attempted to revive the Islamist agenda of the ASG but to no avail because of his dreadful demise in December 2006.

### **LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS IN THE ASG<sup>28</sup>**

According to AFP reports, there were two major factions of the ASG operating independently in two major areas in the Southern Philippines: Basilan and Sulu. Khadafy Janjalani headed the Basilan-based ASG after the death of Abdurajak. Galib Andang, otherwise known as Commander Robot, headed the Sulu-based ASG. But the Sulu group unexpectedly lost its leader with the capture of Commander Robot in December 2003. Commander Robot was eventually killed in a bloody jailbreak attempt on 15 March 2005. Other AFP reports talked of another faction of ASG operating in Zamboanga City with Hadji Radzpal as the main leader. But Hadji Radzpal was also identified by other intelligence sources as one of the leaders of the Sulu-based faction of the ASG. Local leaders have even denied the existence of ASG faction in Zamboanga City.

The Basilan-based ASG was composed of 73 members as of 2002. These members were ASG hard-liners composed of 30 personal followers of Khadafy Janjalani, 30 personal followers of Isnilon Hapilon, and 13 followers of Abu Sabaya. The group of Hapilon was the main security arm of the Basilan-based

ASG. The group of Abu Sabaya, on the other hand, joined the group of Khadafy Janjalani in running the daily planning and administrative affairs of the group. The Philippine military claimed that it killed Sabaya and two others in a naval encounter in June 2002. But Sabaya's body was never found, triggering speculations that he may still be alive despite the AFP's repeated pronouncements that Sabaya was among those who died and drowned in the waters of Sibuco Bay in Zamboanga del Norte.<sup>29</sup> Isnillon Hapilon is now believed to be heading the ASG at present. But other sources said that it is Yasser Igasan who is currently "running the show" of the ASG.

The Sulu-based ASG, on the other hand, was a loose organization of Muslim secessionist fighters loyal to the late Commander Robot. This faction of ASG was responsible for the kidnapping of 21 tourists spending a vacation in a resort in Sipadan Island of Malaysia on 23 April 2000. The Basilan-based and Sulu-based factions of the ASG were also divided into different groups with their own leaders. As of 2002, the Basilan-based faction was composed of ten armed groups while the Sulu-based faction was composed of 16 armed groups. Table 1 shows the Basilan-based groups of the ASG. Table 2, on the other hand, shows the Sulu-based groups of the ASG.

**Table 1. Basilan-Based Faction of the ASG**

<b>Name of Group</b>	<b>Known Leaders of the Group</b>
Ampul Group	Mauran Ampu or Abu Mauran
Apting Group	Abu Apting
Danggatil Group	Moto Danggantil or Mata Danggatil
Hapilon Group	Sahiron Hapilon
Isnilon Group	Isnilon Hapilon
Jainuddin Group	Nadjalin Jainuddin
Janjalani Group	Hector Janjalani or Abu Abral
Kaw Jaljalis Group	Kalaw Jaljalis or Boy Granada
Salagin Group	Abu Salagin
Masiraji Sali Group	Hamsiraji Sali

Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (2002).

**Table 2. Sulu-Based Faction of the ASG**

<b>Name of Group</b>	<b>Known Leaders of the Group</b>
Robot Group	Galib Andang or Cmdr Robot
Amil Group	Julius Aminulla Amil
Asiri Group	Basiri Asiri
Badja Group	Datu Panglima Badja
Bauddin Group	Salapuddin Bauddin
Hayudini Group	Nidzmi Hayudinni or Cmdr Takulong
Hadji Radzpal Group	Hadji Radzpal or Abu Rayhan
Irijani Group	Mudjahid Irijani
Jamal Group	Yahiya Jamal or Abu Alvarez
Kalim Group	Pati Kalim
Landi Group	Kumander Landi
Mali Group	Sulaiman Mali
Saabdula Group	Nadzmi Saabulla or Cmdr Global
Sahiron Group	Radullah Sahiron
Sali Group	Hesseim Sali
Shariff Group	Wahid Shariff


Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3 (undated).

From these groups, it may be observed that the ASG has never become a homogenous organization. Rather, the ASG has been a very loose coalition or alliance, as what Kreuzer describes, of many groups of radical Muslim leaders and bandits commanding their own loyal followers in the Southern Philippines. These groups had mixed objectives from Islamic fundamentalism to mere banditry. Members of these groups paid allegiance mostly to their respective leaders rather than to ASG doctrines. Not all groups were truly committed to the idea of a separate Islamic state in the Southern Philippines, though there was no doubt that some groups were really committed to the cause. Some Muslim bandit groups in the Southern Philippines wanted to be associated with the ASG for prestige, political expediency and economic gains. But the dynamics of these groups shared a common feature: they were highly personalistic rather than ideological groups of Muslim radicals.

Based on the various factions, the organizational set-up of the ASG was far from those envisioned by Abdurajak Jajalani. Figure 2 was the known organizational structure of the ASG as of 2003. Recent organizational set-up of the ASG has not been publicly released. In fact, the AFP reported in June 2007

that remnants of ASG were suffering intense internal political rivalries and personal intrigues.

**Figure 2. ASG Organization After the Death of A. Janjalani**



Source: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Various documents, 2000-2004.

### **ASG STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES<sup>30</sup>**

During its embryonic stage, the ASG started with no more than 1,000 members in 1991 and rose to almost 1,300 in 1998. From 2000 to 2007, the strength of the ASG dramatically reduced from its peak of 1,269 members to 430 (Figure 3). Based on the third quarter 2008 Threat Assessment of the AFP, the strength of the ASG was reduced to not more than 350 members from its strength of 522 when the “Oplan Ultimatum” started.

Rather than belabor on the exact strength of the ASG, what is certain is that the ASG remains a very small but very lethal armed group of Muslims in the Philippine. Despite its small number, the ASG draws its strength from huge local support. Most ASG members are relatives, friends, classmates and neighbors of local folks. ASG members even buy their foodstuffs from local stores and get “early warning signals” from local communities during military offensives. The Philippine military said that religious and political propaganda, financial compensation and even coercion are the ASG’s primary means of gaining local support in the form of manpower, intelligence and sometime logistics.<sup>31</sup>

Local support enhances the capability of the ASG. The AFP reported that the ASG had the capability to stage “high impact terrorist attacks against civilian targets not only in Basilan and Sulu but also in other parts of the country.” When ASG members fight, they “can pin-down up to a company size unit” and during military engagements, they are capable of “reinforcing beleaguered members in a short period of time” particularly in areas “near a Muslim village of an MNLF and MILF camps”. There are even some “enterprising Muslims

who join the fight purposely to acquire firearms and ammunitions left by government casualties.”

**Figure 3. ASG Strength from 1993-2007**



Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2008.

As of the last quarter of 2007, military intelligence estimated around 382 weapons believed to be in ASG’s possession. In previous military encounters, the military seized night vision devices, thermal imager, sniper’s scope, various types of commercial radios, satellite and cellular phones and high speed sea crafts from the ASG. Military intelligence assessment also indicates that some ASG members have enhanced their bomb making capabilities as a result of joint training with JI members operating or hiding in the Philippines. Before his death in October 2003, Roman Al-Ghozi, known to be the JI’s “the bomb maker”, admitted during interrogation report that he shared his bomb-making expertise with ASG members. Rohmat Abdurrohim, (a.k.a. Zaki), known as the ASG’s “the bomb trainer”, confessed that he trained ASG members in bomb making, particularly the use of mobile phone as detonating device and the use of toothpaste tube as bomb paraphernalia. Dulmatin and Umar Patek, wanted for the 2002 Bali bombing, reportedly trained some ASG members in bomb attacks. As stated earlier, Dulmatin and Umar Patek also prepared ASG members for

future suicide missions. National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales was quoted as saying, "What we are looking for now is suicide terrorists, not (only) suicide bombers."<sup>32</sup>

The ASG has also developed capability to use car bombs. Khadaffy Janjalani boasted that he allowed training in 2004 of a long line of bombers who could hit targets in major cities in the Philippines. The ASG reportedly formed an Urban Squad in 2005 to stage bombing operations in the cities. The ASG has also developed the ability to wage maritime terrorist attacks. Almost all ASG members have deep familiarity of the maritime domain having belonged to a family of fisher folks with a long seafaring tradition.<sup>33</sup> The Superferry 14 bombing in February 2004 killing 116 people and injuring around 300 others was a clear demonstration of ASG's maritime terrorist capability. The group also conducted some maritime training activities in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in June 2005. In July 2005, ASG and JI fighters took underwater training in Sandakan, Malaysia to attack maritime targets such as ports and commercial vessels. In August 2005, military intelligence disclosed that ASG leaders and some foreign terrorists met in Patikul, Sulu to plan an attack of some beaches in Palawan. This prompted the Philippine government to intensify the security of major ports and beaches in the country preventing any planned maritime terrorist attacks to happen.

Because of its small size, the executive department of the Philippine government has belittled the capability of the ASG by describing the group as a spent force. This was strongly resented by the ASG leadership. In his official statement, ASG spokesperson Jainal Sali, (a.k.a. Abu Sulaiman) argued that government officials are "belittling us, but they are exaggerating the problem of terrorism in the country."<sup>34</sup> In a telephone interview pertaining to the Superferry 14 bombing, Abu Sulaiman also taunted the Philippine government by saying, "'Still doubtful about our capabilities? Good. Just wait and see. We will bring the war that you impose on us to your lands and seas, homes and streets. We will multiply the pain and suffering that you have inflicted on our people."<sup>35</sup>

Though the membership of the ASG continues to be small at present, it is reported to have been venturing into vigorous recruitment activities to recover from the loss of its members who were killed, neutralized and arrested after 9/11, particularly in the context of Oplan Ultimatum.

The ASG has various techniques to recruit members. Aside from religious propaganda and agitation, the ASG motivates recruits through financial reward. It also pays local recruits to serve as second and third security layer of their makeshift camps. Some members start their recruitment process by initially befriending potential recruits through ball games or pot (marijuana) sessions.

The ASG also utilizes deception to recruit members. ASG leaders allow young Muslims to bring their firearms and take pictures of them and then use the pictures to blackmail them of joining the group.<sup>36</sup> The ASG also uses marriages to expand its membership. At present, the ASG is paying attention to younger and more idealistic MILF members who regard the on-going peace process with the Philippine government as a sham. ASG leaders think that if the MILF makes peace with the government, they will inherit firebrands in the Southern Philippines. MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim warned that a great deal is needed quickly “before younger Muslims in the region succumb to the greater radicalism of the Abu Sayyaf.”<sup>37</sup>

### **ASG LINKAGES WITH OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES<sup>38</sup>**

Despite the declining number of ASG operatives due to sustained military crackdown in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga City, the group continues to wreak terrorist havoc because of its superb ability to establish strong linkages with other groups operating in the Philippines, namely the JI, the MNLF, the MILF and the RSIM. The ASG also has a creative and sophisticated means to solicit local support, which undoubtedly contribute to its resilience as a terrorist organization.

#### **ASG Linkages with JI**

ASG linkages with JI have already been excellently discussed by various authors.<sup>39</sup> Although the organizational dynamics of JI and ASG are undergoing dramatic changes in the midst of a changing national and regional security environment, latest developments indicate that JI-ASG linkage remains in tact and operational. Intelligence sources reveal that the number of JI members in the Philippines collaborating with ASG was placed at 33 as of December 2004. The Philippine National Police Intelligence Group even estimates that the number of JI operatives in the Philippines may be placed at 60 as of April 2005.<sup>40</sup> These JI operatives continue to exploit local Muslim secessionist rebels in the Philippines by sharing their demolition skills.<sup>41</sup>

In connection with the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings, two Indonesians and a Malaysian allegedly belonging to the JI were arrested by intelligence operatives in Zamboanga City on 23 February 2005. But the arrest of Rohmat alias “Zaki” on 16 March 2005 gave a more substantial information about the recent JI-ASG linkages. Zaki, an Indonesian national, confessed to several crimes involving the ASG since 2000, including training members to make bombs in JI-run camps.<sup>42</sup> Known as the “ASG the bomb trainer”, Zaki admitted that he



trained ASG members in bomb making, particularly the use of mobile phones as detonating devices and the use of toothpaste as bomb paraphernalia.”<sup>43</sup> He also admitted to have coordinated the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings, which resulted in the brutal death of 10 people and the serious wounding of at least 150 others.

Estimated number of JI operating in the Philippines was 25-30. Their frequent areas of operations are Camp Hudeibah, Mount Cararao; Mount Piagayongan, Butig, Lanao del Sur; Barangay Kamanga, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat; Barangay Kamanga, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat; Mount Magaturing, Maguindanao; Sitio Katol, Barangay Damading, Salipada K. Pendatun, Maguindanao; Barangay Bagoinged, Pagalungan, Maguindanao; and Barangay Nangaan and Simone, both in Kabacan, Cotabato. The current leader of JI in the Philippines is reportedly Fausan Abdullah (a.k.a. Usman Rizal), an Indonesian national. Two JI personalities (Dulmatin and Umar Patek) known suspects for the October 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia are reported to be hiding in Sulu with key ASG leaders.

### **ASG Linkages with the MNLF**

It is already well-known that most ASG members are disgruntled members of the MNLF. But their links go beyond that. ASG members continue to connive with MNLF members to plant bombs, kidnap people and commit murder. A police intelligence report reveals that ASG has forged alliances with some gunmen loyal to jailed MNLF leader Nur Misuari.<sup>44</sup> Chief Police Superintendent Rodolfo Mendoza of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) says that alliance between ASG and the MNLF were formed two to three years ago. According to Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF), this alliance is on a tactical or operational level.<sup>45</sup>

Ruland Ullah, a former ASG member and now a state witness to the April 2000 Sipadan hostage crisis, confirms these observations when he says that ASG has hired MNLF fighters to mount terrorist attacks. MNLF members have even acted as mercenaries of the ASG for an amount of at least \$1,000. MNLF members also provided sanctuaries for ASG members when needed.<sup>46</sup> They also shared fighters to mount terrorist attacks not only in the Southern Philippines but also in Metro Manila. When the AFP launched the Oplan Ultimatum in 2006, the "rogue" faction of the MNLF led by commander Ustadz Habier Malik reportedly helped members of the ASG in some of their encounters.<sup>47</sup>

## **ASG Linkages with the MILF**

Former President Joseph Estrada tried to link the ASG with the MILF. But there was no clear evidence of the link during his time. Thomas McKenna, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and author of *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines*,<sup>48</sup> even said that "It is certainly possible that some disaffected MILF fighters have gone over to the ASG," but "the ASG may be best viewed as a direct challenge to both the MILF and MNLF, not as an adjunct."<sup>49</sup>

But recent evidences indicate that the ASG has strongly established tactical alliance with the MILF. Although former Secretary of National Defense Eduardo Ermita once argued that MILF members have not shown any proof that they have helped the ASG,<sup>50</sup> new intelligence sources have revealed that ASG and MILF members have shared fighters in their operations. According to Ullah, "Sometimes the MILF would plant a roadside bomb against soldiers and the Abu Sayyaf would shoot the soldiers wounded in the blast."<sup>51</sup> MILF and ASG members also receive joint training with JI operatives, particularly in the area of bomb making. In a paper obtained from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, "During explosives training, JI teaches the MILF or ASG skills in the making of bombs with cell phones, in the identification of the different types of explosives and paraphernalia like TNT, black powder, PETN, Ammonium Nitrate, C4, Detonating Cords, and Detonators."<sup>52</sup> In one military intelligence report, Indonesian JI member Taufiq Rifke talked about how JI forged the relationship between MILF and the ASG that allowed the Abu Sayyaf to train in MILF camps.<sup>53</sup>

At present, the Philippine government is getting a peace deal with the MILF.<sup>54</sup> ASG leaders think that if the MILF makes peace with the government, they will inherit firebrands in the Southern Philippines. Thus, MILF leader Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim argued that a great deal was needed quickly "before younger Muslims in the region succumb to the greater radicalism of the Abu Sayyaf."<sup>55</sup> But a top ASG leader exclaimed that "If this sell-out succeeds, more blood will flow because the young are more determined *jihadis*. We will soon find out there are more Osama bin Ladens in our midst."<sup>56</sup>

## **ASG Linkages with the RSIM**

One of the ASG's newest links is with the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) also known as Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) or Rajah Solaiman Revolutionary Movement (RSRM).<sup>57</sup> The RSIM is a clandestine Muslim organization in Manila collaborating with the ASG in waging urban terrorism. The group is named after Rajah Solaiman, the last king of Manila before the

Spanish conquest in the 1500s. Most of its members are Muslim converts. Like the ASG, the converts claim that they want to remake the country into an Islamic state.<sup>58</sup> It was estimated that the RSIM had at least 70 members in Luzon as of April 2005. The Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA), on the other hand, reports that more than 110,000 Filipinos have converted to Islam as of the first quarter of 2005.

Some writers have traced the origin of the RSIM from the Balik Islam (Return to Islam) movement.<sup>59</sup> While founding members of the RSIM have indeed associated themselves with the Balik Islam, it is careless to associate Balik Islam with RSIM – it is like associating Islam with terrorism. Started in the 1970s, Balik Islam is a legitimate organization of at least 200,000 Christian converts to Islamic faith. Followers prefer to be called reverts based on the belief that Islam was the original religion of the Philippines. The RSIM, organized only in 2001, represents a very minuscule fraction of reverts.

Though Ahmad Santos (Hilarion del Rosario Santos III) was the known RSIM commander, the group was founded with the leading role of Sheik Omar Lavilla (Rueben Lavilla). With the arrest of Santos on 26 October 2005, Lavilla is believed to be running the daily operation of the RSM to date. Lavilla has called RSIM members as “Urban Mujahideens”.



Prof. Rommel Banlaoi with Ahmed Santos.  
Photo taken on 12 August 2008 at Bicutan Jail.

During his interrogation, Santos was accused of organizing in 2001 a group of 20 radical Muslim reverts to undergo “*jihad* trainings” in a camp in Anda, Pangasinan of Central Luzon. Santos and Lavilla originally called this group *Haraka* or *Harakat*, which literally means “the movement”. Police General Rodolfo “Boogie” Mendoza, the father of counter-terrorism investigation in the Philippines, says that “the name Rajah Solaiman Movement was initially suggested by Ahmad Santos as a joke but it was eventually adopted.” The RSIM was used in honor of the first Muslim ruler of Manila. RSIM aims for the Islamization of the entire Philippines.

Reportedly, the RSIM has a special operations group and a special action force financed by Saudi Arabian money channeled through various charities in the Philippines. ASG leader Khadafy Janjalani reportedly gave the RSIM the equivalent of about \$200,000 for its initial operational activities in Manila, which included the recruitment and conversion of Christians to Islam, then sending them for terrorist training.<sup>60</sup>

The blasting of the Superferry 14 on 26 February 2004 has been described as the handiwork of ASG-RSM conspiracy. Redento Cain Dellosa, a Muslim convert associated with RSIM, was accused of deliberately planting a bomb on Superferry 14. The Marine Board Inquiry in charge of investigating the Superferry 14 incident confirmed that the ASG masterminded the explosion with the assistance of RSIM.



Prof. Rommel Banlaoi with Redento Cain Dellosa  
Photo taken on 12 August 2008 at Bicutan Jail.

Interestingly, ASG links with RSIM also run in the family. Amina Lim Dungon, one of the wives of ASG spokesman Abu Sulaiman, is the sister of Lorraine Lim Dungon, who is a wife of RSIM leader Ahmed Santos. ASG leader Khadafy Janjallani's wife, Zainad Lim Dungon, is a sister of Amina and Lorraine. These make Sulaiman, Santos and Janjallani not only "brothers-in-arms" but also brothers-in-law. Some ICC officers are also kin to Fi-Sabillilah and RSIM leaders.<sup>61</sup> According to Police General Mendoza of the PNP, "If you make an extended family tree of top Islamic radicals, you will come out with something like a tightly woven spider's web."<sup>62</sup> This view is shared with another top police officer who argues that that ties between ASG and RSIM and even MILF and MNLF "are more personal than ideological" because "there are blood ties, and they have an experience of strife with government."<sup>63</sup> General Florencio D. Fianza, the President's Special Envoy on Transnational Crime, says that ASG, RSIM and even MILF and MNLF help each other to carry out terrorist activities.<sup>64</sup> But Fianza contends that though they help each other, they also have their own share of infightings and turf wars.

### ***ASG Mass Base***

One important strength of the ASG, despite its small number, is its superb ability to solicit local support. The ASG resorted to kidnapping activities not merely for purposes of committing criminal acts but to use part of its huge ransom money to build-up its manpower and to lure local communities to provide mass support to the organization. When kidnapping activities of the ASG became a lucrative venture, it succeeded in offering monetary compensation to local population to become core members of its mass base support system.<sup>65</sup> Some local government leaders even reportedly coddle some ASG members in exchange for monetary payment.<sup>66</sup> It has been reported that local police and military even provide support to the ASG in return for a cut of its loot and ransom money the group gets.<sup>67</sup>

## **CONFRONTING THE ASG THREAT: PHILIPPINE ANTI-TERRORISM STRATEGY AND ITS LIMITS**

To address the threats of terrorism in the Philippines, the Philippine government formed the Inter-Agency Task Force Against International Terrorism on 24 September 2001 under the direct supervision of the Office of the President.<sup>68</sup> This Inter-Agency Task Force aimed to coordinate intelligence operations and to facilitate the identification and neutralization of suspected terrorist cells in the Philippines. To freeze the financial assets of international terrorists, the Philippine Congress decisively passed the Anti-Money Laundering

Act on 29 September 2001. President Arroyo also announced on 12 October 2001 its 14-pillar approach to combat terrorism. (See Box 1)

**Box 1. 14 Pillars to Combat Terrorism in the Philippines**

- Designates Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security as the lead anti-terrorism body;
- Seeks to undertake consolidate intelligence projects;
- Calls on the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police to address terrorist violence;
- Holds accountable all public and private organizations abetting terrorism;
- Seeks regional consensus and cooperation especially with Indonesia and Malaysia in the war against terrorism;
- Anticipates legal issues and concerns;
- Pursues Christian-Muslim dialog and seeks to promote ecumenism;
- Calls for greater vigilance and concrete measures against all possible terrorist supplies, materials and finances;
- Mobilizes disaster coordination efforts in the event of catastrophic attack;
- Secures critical infrastructure;
- Protects overseas workers and seeks their immediate transfer if needed;
- Seeks the integration of the global terrorist threat in the AFP/PNP modernization program;
- Asks for media responsibility; and,
- Seeks to address the socioeconomic and political roots of “perceived fanaticism and irrational violence.

*Source: Memorandum Order No. 37 dated 12 October 2001.*

Through the Operation Center of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COCIS)<sup>69</sup> the Philippine government formulated the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences as Annex K to the National Internal Security Plan (NISP). The Philippine government approved the NISP on 26 November 2001 through Memorandum Order 44. The COCIS was tasked to implement the national anti-terrorism plan by involving all national government

agencies, local government units (LGUs), and the private sectors in the campaign.<sup>70</sup> (See Figure 3)


But the Philippine government abolished the COCIS in October 2004. The task of managing and implementing the anti-terrorism plan was then transferred to the ATTF, which was originally formed on 24 March 2004 under the COCIS. The ATTF is now operating under the Office of the President with the Executive Secretary as the Chair. The ATTF is now based in Malacanang Palace in Manila. The ATTF aims to establish an extensive anti-terrorism information system and accelerate intelligence fusion among all intelligence units in the Philippines in the identification of terrorism personalities, cells, groups, and organizations in various LGUs. (See Figure 4) It also aims to conduct an extensive information drive at both national and local levels “to prepare the public and all stakeholders to get involved in the national anti-terrorism campaign.”<sup>71</sup>

**Figure 3. Organizational Structure of the now Defunct Cabinet Oversight Committee On Internal Security**



Source: Operation Center, Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, July 2004

**Figure 4. Organizational Structure of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force**



With the creation of ATTF, the Philippine government adopts the 16-point counter-terrorism program to operationalize the 14-point anti-terrorism policy of the national government. (See Box 2)



### **Box 2. 16-Point Counter-Terrorism Program**

- Supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the government against terrorism
- Intelligence coordination
- Internal focus against terrorism
- Accountability and private corporations and personalities
- Synchronizing internal efforts with global outlook
- Legal measures
- Promotion of Christian and Muslim solidarity
- Vigilance against the movement of terrorist and their supporters, equipment, weapons, and funds
- Contingency plans
- Comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructures
- Support for overseas Filipino workers
- Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
- Media Support
- Political, social, and economic measures
- Ensuring the accountability of local and national government in cleaning the government of terrorist and criminal coddlers
- Strengthening the peace process

*Source: Anti-Terrorism Task Force Accomplishment Report, June 2004.*

As counter-legal measure, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed into law the Human Security Act of 2007 on 6 March 2007. More known as the Anti-Terrorism Law, it imposes 40 years of imprisonment to convicted terrorists with no parole. To dispel the fear that the proposed law may be used against human rights, it provides provision for the compensation of P500,000 a day for victims wrongly arrested by the police. It also provides provision for the protection of communication between the media and their sources, doctors and clients and other safeguards that aim to protect the rights of individuals.

The Philippine anti-terrorism law also establishes the Anti-Terrorism Council chaired by the Executive Secretary. The Council is mandated to assume the responsibility for the proper and effective implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the Philippines. The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) serves as the Secretariat of the Council. The Council is also

tasked to formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and effective anti-terrorism plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the country and to protect the people from acts of terrorism. Specifically, the Council is mandated to perform the following functions:

1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists and acts of terrorism in the country;
2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism in the country and mobilize the entire nation against terrorism proscribed in this Act;
3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other offenses punishable under this Act, and monitor the progress of their cases;
4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information systems on terrorism, terrorist activities, and counter-terrorism operations;
5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160 otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended;
6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital information leading to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction of person or persons who are liable for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of other nations in the struggle against international terrorism; and
8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals and regional trial courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case may be, to handle all cases involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and all matters incident to said crimes.

Aside from the national anti-terrorism law, the Philippines is also a party to at least twelve international terrorism related Conventions and Protocols, including the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism signed in January 2007.

Because terrorism is not only a national security problem but also a serious local peace and order problem, local government sectors in the Philippines joined the national government in the campaign against terrorism. In November 2002, the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP) passed a resolution condemning terrorism in strongest terms. Presently composed of

1,500 member municipalities, LMP regards terrorism as “a serious threat to the security and well-being not only of the Filipino people but also of the whole civilized world.”<sup>72</sup> It urged all municipalities in the Philippine to adopt a unified course of action to fight terrorism and criminality by:

- Activating the Peace and Order Council;
- Creating a local intelligence-gathering network; and,
- Establishing other strategies and mechanism to fight the menace, including provisions for funds.

The LMP also established closer partnership with defense establishment in order to implement its anti-terrorism plan at the municipal level. During its major island conferences and general assemblies, LMP involved various defense officials in its programs and activities in order to increase the awareness of municipal chief executives on terrorism and counter-terrorism.

The League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) also joined the fight against terrorism when it expressed its unwavering support on the passage of anti-terrorism bill. It even supported the passage of the controversial national identification system and vowed to acquire modern equipment such as metal detectors and train bomb-sniffing dogs that would be utilized against terrorist threats.<sup>73</sup> The LCP is presently composed of 116 member cities.

The League of Provinces of the Philippines (LPP), on the other hand, asked the national government for the timely release of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to LGUs in order to finance its drive against terrorism. But President Arroyo urged Philippine provinces to take the initiatives in raising their own funds.<sup>74</sup> The LPP comprises 79 member-provinces to date.

To fight terrorism at the grassroots level, the *Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas* (LBP or League of Philippine Villages) also launched its anti-terrorism campaign when it forged closer partnership with the ATTF. On 8 June 2004, the League and the ATTF published an advocacy material, *Gabay ng Barangay Laban sa Terorismo* (Villages Guide Against Terrorism), to increase local government awareness about the gravity of terrorist threats. This advocacy material contains fundamental discussions on the definition of terrorism and how to respond to terrorist threats at the village level. The League adopts what it calls “4A’s to Fight Terrorism”: Awareness, Alertness, Action, and Advocacy.<sup>75</sup> The League is composed of more than 42,700 members.

Though various local government associations in the Philippines have expressed their support to the anti-terrorism campaign of the national

government, they have not yet developed their own capabilities to fight the menace. Beyond making motherhood statements, leagues of local governments do not have the money and technical expertise to wage their own battle against terrorism. Their primary role is to assist the national government in the anti-terrorism advocacy and awareness campaigns.

Through its unrelenting efforts to combat terrorism in the Philippines both at the national and local levels, the Philippine government has, nonetheless, reduced the strength of the ASG. But the real success of anti-terrorism campaign in the Philippines depends heavily on strength of its intelligence system. Sadly, Philippine government still has a weak intelligence system being a relatively young republic. Although the Philippine government issued Administrative Order No. 68 on 8 April 2003 to strengthen the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), the government's intelligence capability remains weak. Former Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Narciso Abaya candidly acknowledged that the non-sharing of intelligence information by military spy units in the Philippines is hampering the government's antiterrorism campaign.<sup>76</sup> Abaya said that a culture exists among intelligence units in the Philippines to withhold vital intelligence information from other groups and stressed that "I think we have to improve on our intelligence. The trend now is not the need to know but the need to share. That is the emerging trend among intelligence units all over the world."<sup>77</sup> He further lamented that "Sometimes, our intelligence units zealously keep to themselves intelligence information which, if fused with the information of other intelligence units, would give a more comprehensive picture of the enemy."<sup>78</sup> This problem in Philippine intelligence system still persists but measures have been undertaken to surmount the problem.

Another nagging concern in the Philippines' anti-terrorism campaign is the serious allegation that the military and provincial government are coddling some ASG members. Based on the report of the International Peace Mission that went to Basilan on 23-27 March 2002, "there are consistent credible reports that the military and the provincial government are coddling the Abu Sayyaf."<sup>79</sup> Thus, the Peace Mission finds that a military solution to the ASG threat "will not work to solve the problem."<sup>80</sup> As early as 1994, in fact, there were allegations that some police and fake police officers were involved in the ASG attempt to smuggle firearms in Zamboanga City from Manila and Iloilo on board the vessel M/V Princess of the Pacific. But the police and the military authorities have stressed that connivance with ASG is not being tolerated and contend that those found guilty of this misdemeanor will be punished accordingly.

The Philippine military has, in fact, recognized that military solution alone cannot defeat the ASG. In the After Action Report of the ASG Combat Research and Study Group of the Training and Doctrine Command of the

Philippine Army submitted on 19 September 2001 to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, it states that:

The ASG problem cannot be solved through military solution alone. It should be approached by complementary and mutually reinforcing efforts by the civil agencies and the military. The government must concretely pursue social, economic and political reforms aimed at addressing the root causes of the problem. Effective measures must also be undertaken to ensure the welfare and protection of civilians and reducing the impact of the armed conflict on them. These should necessarily include intensified delivery of basic services to conflict areas.<sup>81</sup>

To surmount the threats posed by ASG and other threats to Philippine internal security, the Philippine government established, as stated earlier, the COCIS. The COCIS adopts the “Strategy of Holistic Approach” (SHA) as the grand strategy to overcome insurgency problems in the Philippines, including the ASG. The SHA consists of four major components:

- Political/Legal/Diplomatic
- Socio-Economic/Psychosocial
- Peace and order/Security, and
- Information.<sup>82</sup>

The political/legal/diplomatic component of the SHA pushes for “political reforms and institutional development to strengthen democratic institutions and empower the citizenry to pursue personal and community growth.” This component aims to develop and propagate Philippine democracy to “confront the communist ideology” and the Islamic fundamentalist ideology. The cornerstone of this particular component is the peace process based on the “Six Paths to Peace” formula:

- Pursuit of social, economic and political reforms;
- Consensus-building and empowerment for peace;
- Peaceful, negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups;
- Programs for reconciliation, reintegration, and rehabilitation;
- Conflict management and protection of civilians caught in armed conflict; and,
- Building and nurturing a climate conducive to peace.

The socio-economic/psychosocial component of the SHA, on the other hand, aims to alleviate poverty in the country through the acceleration of development programs of the Philippine government. This component also aims to develop and strengthen “a spirit of nationhood among the people, which include developing national character/identity without losing cultural integrity.”

The peace and order/security component aims “to protect the people from the insurgents and provide a secure environment for national development.” More importantly, this component has the specific goal of denying the insurgents “access to their most important resource – popular support.”

Finally, the information component is the integrating component in the SHA. It “refers to the overall effort to advocate peace, promote public confidence in government and support government efforts to overcome insurgency through tri-media and interpersonal approaches.”

The operational aspect of the SHA is the “Left Hand” and “Right Hand” approaches. In an interview, President Arroyo explains these approaches in the following words:

*How do we address this problem (of) insurgency? Through the right-hand and left-hand approach. (The) right hand is the full force of the law and the left hand is the hand of reconciliation and the hand of giving support to our poorest brothers so that they won't be encouraged to join the rebels.<sup>83</sup>*

While the SHA is meant to primarily combat communist insurgency, it is also being applied to address terrorist threats.<sup>84</sup> But as stated earlier, the Philippine government abolished COCIS in October 2004. To replace the COCIS in the implementation of SHA in counter-terrorism, the Philippine government transferred the responsibilities to the ATTF. The ATTF is presently the main government body tasked to formulate strategies, policies, plans and measures necessary to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism in the Philippines, particularly those perpetuated by the ASG. But the ATTF, to date, is still undergoing organizational restructuring.

With the abolition of the COCIS, the Philippine government also replaced the SHA with the strategy of “whole-of-government” (WOG) approach against terrorism and insurgency. Like the SHA, the WOG aims to address the root causes of security challenges facing the Philippine state. But the WOG pays greater attention to non-military means to defeat terrorism, which includes job

creation in the rural areas, provisions of social services and infrastructure to communities, strengthening good governance at the national and local levels and establishment of an effective local judiciary system.<sup>85</sup>

To date, there has been no study assessing the practical effectiveness of WOG. But based on documents, the WOG contains a lot of flamboyant sound bytes that extol the value of non-military approaches to address the problem of terrorism posed by the ASG and other similar groups.

## **CONCLUSION**

Despite its small number, the ASG, seven years after 9/11, remains a terrible threat to Philippine national security, particularly the peace and order in the Southern Philippines. Though the ASG has lost some of its important leaders, it has managed to survive at present because of its ability forge alliances with other terrorist organizations operating in the Philippines and to solicit mass support. Its new tactics of using front organizations also make the ASG a very resilient terrorist organization in the Philippines.

The Philippine government has waged serious campaigns to address the problem of terrorism in the country. It has made remarkable achievements in neutralizing ASG members and leaders operating in the Southern Philippines.

But the root of rebellion in the Southern Philippines, which encourages some Muslim Filipinos to resort to terrorism, has not been satisfactorily addressed by the Philippine government. Though the Philippine government has implemented the strategy of holistic approach to address the problem of Muslim rebellion, the military continues to call the shot in the implementation. Even the strategy of “whole-of-government” approach also suffers the same limitations.

Poverty and injustices have been repeatedly identified as major roots of terrorism in the Southern Philippines. The situation that gave rise to the ASG was marred by poverty, lack of services, inadequate infrastructure and lack of opportunity.<sup>86</sup> This situation is aggravated by the fact that the Philippine state has a poor record in the ASG heartland of Mindanao.<sup>87</sup> The *Moro*, which account for only 5% of the total Philippine population, suffers the lowest poverty and highest mortality rates, the least developed economy and minimal institutional government support.<sup>88</sup> In Basilan Province alone, which is the ASG’s bailiwick, Muslims own only 25% of the land and the rest are owned by Christian population. This creates the feeling of immense animosity between Muslim and

Christians in the area.<sup>89</sup> *Moros* also feel the pain of silent discrimination because of their Islamic beliefs and “different” ways of life.

For centuries, *Moros* also developed the feeling of dispossession by taking away their ancestral domains. Thus, they fight for self-determination to regain their homeland through *Moro* separatism, which some Philippine government officials describe as Muslim terrorism.<sup>90</sup> The confluence of silent discrimination, dispossession of *Moro* homeland, and *four centuries of struggle for Moro sovereignty* have inflamed the ASG’s militant activities in pursuit of an independent Islamic state.<sup>91</sup> The ASG is cognizant of the historical experience, structural inequity, injustices and economic deprivation of the *Bangsamoro* people. In its public statement issued in November 1994, the ASG declared that its struggle was to seek *kaadilan* or justice for the *Bangsamoro* people who have been the suffering the long history of colonial rule.

Unless poverty is alleviated and justice served, the Philippines will continue to face the vicious cycle of “terrorist” threats posed by the ASG. As stressed by one analyst, there is a need to mitigate the success of terrorism with “the politics of truth and justice.”<sup>92</sup> One important way of doing this is to transform the quality of governance in the Philippines to be more transparent, accountable, responsive and participatory. Unless the Philippine government wins the hearts and minds of the ASG leaders and members through effective governance, the country is doomed to suffer the vicious cycle of terrorism and political violence.



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## END NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Also see Peter Chalk, "Al Qaeda and its Links to Terrorist Groups in Asia" in Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (eds), *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-Strategies* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), pp. 107-128.

<sup>2</sup>See for example Djanicelle J. Berrevelde, *Terrorism in the Philippines: The Bloody Trail of Abu Sayyaf, Bin Ladens East Asian Connection* (San Jose: Writers Club Press, 2001); Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003) and Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: The Crucible of Terror* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003). For an insightful analysis on the evolution of ASG, see Rohan Gunaratna, "The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group", *Janes Intelligence Review* (July 2001). For a very excellent historical analysis, see Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Bearer of the Sword", *Military Review* (March/ April 2002), pp. 38-47. For an analysis of ASG and civil society, see Alfredo Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Winter 2002). Also see Larry Niksch, "Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation", *CRS Report for Congress* (25 January 2002) and Mark Turner, "Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayyaf", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June 1995), pp. 1-19.

<sup>3</sup>This section is from Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case" (Paper presented to the international symposium, "The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia" organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses in cooperation with the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism and the U.S. Pacific Command held at Palace of Golden Horses Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 18-20 April 2005). Also in John T. Hanley, Kongdan Oh Hassig and Caroline F. Ziemke, eds., *Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2005).

<sup>4</sup>Carl Thayer, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia" (Paper presented to the international symposium, "The Dynamics and Structures of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia" organized by the Institute of Defense Analyses in cooperation with the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism and the U.S. Pacific Command held at Palace of Golden Horses Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 18-20 April 2005).

<sup>5</sup>See Eusaquito P. Manalo, *Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group* (MA Thesis: Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004).

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Glenda Gloria, "Bearer of the Sword: The Abu Sayyaf Has Nebulous Beginnings and Incoherent Aims", *Mindanao Updates* (6 June 2000).

<sup>8</sup>Quoted in Samuel K. Tan, *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 2003), revised edition, p. 96.

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<sup>9</sup>See for example, Peter Gowing, *Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines* (Manila: Federation of Christian Churches, 1964); Cesar A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973); W.K. Che Man, *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of the Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Mehol K. Sadain, *Global and Regional Trends in Islamic Resurgence: Their Implications on the Southern Philippines* (Pasay City: Foreign Service Institute, 1994); Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 1998).; Eric Gutierrez, et al., *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000); Soliman Santos, Jr., *The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001).

<sup>10</sup>I am referring to Samuel K. Tan, “The Juma’a Abu Sayyap: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle” (A draft unpublished manuscript, 24 April 2000).

<sup>11</sup>These intelligence briefings are classified secret. Thus, details of these reports can not be used in this paper.

<sup>12</sup>Khadaffy Janjalani, “A Brief History of the Al-Harakatul Islamiyyah” at <http://www.geocities.com/ghrabah101>. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Al-Harakatul Islamiyyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group* (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 2006).

<sup>13</sup>Peter Kreuzer, “Political Clans and Violence in Southern Philippines”, *PRIF Report*, no. 71 (2005), p. 28.

<sup>14</sup> Abu Hamdie, “The Abu Sayyaf Group” (undated and unpublished manuscript).

<sup>15</sup>“Special Report on the Abou Sayaff” (Briefing of MIG9 during the Southern Command Conference, 19 January 1994).

<sup>16</sup>Marites D. Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, *Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, Institute for Popular Democracy and Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000) and Mark Turner, “The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf”, *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 388.

<sup>17</sup>Manalo, p. 31.

<sup>18</sup>See for example, Angel Rabasa, “Southeast Asia: Moderate Tradition and Radical Challenge” in Angel Rabasa, et al. *The Muslim World After 9/11* (Santa Monica, RAND: Rand, 2004), Chapter 8. Also see “Inside Abu Sayyaf” at [http://www.inq7.net/specials/inside\\_abusayyaf/2001/features/formative\\_years.htm](http://www.inq7.net/specials/inside_abusayyaf/2001/features/formative_years.htm).

<sup>19</sup>Gloria, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup>Tan, “The Juma’a Abu Sayyap: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle”, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup>See For example, Turbiville, Jr., pp. 38-47.

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<sup>22</sup>Jose Torres, Jr., *Into the Mountain: Hostages by the Abu Sayyaf* (Quezon City: Claretian Publications, 2001), p. 35.

<sup>23</sup>This section is from Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case", op. cit.

<sup>24</sup>This section is culled from Rommel Banlaoi, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat", *US Naval War College Review*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005).

<sup>25</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, *Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study* (Quezon City: Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, undated).

<sup>26</sup>To know more about the strategy of the ASG, see Office of the Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence, *Field Handout: Doctrinal Extract for the Abu Sayyaf Group* (Headquarters of the Philippine Marine Corps, 21 January 2002).

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.* Also based on various intelligence briefings obtained by the author.

<sup>28</sup>This section is from Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case", op. cit.

<sup>29</sup>"Sabaya's Death not the End Abu Sayyaf, says Basilan Bishop", *MindaNews* (29 June 2002) at <http://www.mindanews.com/2002/07/1st/nws29abu.html> <accessed on 30 August 2004>. A very close friend of mine who was a member of the Special Warfare Group (SWAG) who did the actual operation against Abu Sabaya told me that Sabaya was indeed killed in the said battle.

<sup>30</sup>This section is an updated section in Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Banditry to Terrorism" in Daljit Sing and Lorraine Salazar (eds), *Southeast Asian Affairs 2006* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 23-38.

<sup>31</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, *Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study*, p. 13.

<sup>32</sup>Michael Punongbayan, "DOJ to Expose Terrorists' Financiers, Media Handlers", *The Philippine Star*, 7 November 2005.

<sup>33</sup>For more discussions on the maritime terrorist capability of the ASG, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat", *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), pp. 63-80. Also see Rommel C. Banlaoi, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: Threat of Maritime Piracy and Terrorism" in Peter Lehr (ed), *Violence at Sea: Piracy at the Age of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2006).

<sup>34</sup>Cited in Abuza, *Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf*, p. 11.

<sup>35</sup>Marco Garrido, "After Madrid, Manila?", *Asia Times*, 24 April 2004, at <[http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\\_Asia/FD24Ae01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD24Ae01.html)> (accessed on 28 August 2004).

<sup>36</sup>Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, *Knowing the Terrorists: The Abu Sayyaf Study*, p. 41.

<sup>37</sup>Simon Elegant, "The Return of the Abu Sayyaf," *Time Asia* (30 August 2004).

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<sup>38</sup> This section is from Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Case", op. cit.

<sup>39</sup>See Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Zachary Abuza, "Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (December 2002), pp. 427-465.; Maria Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003) and Rommel C. Banlaoi, *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (Manila: Rex Book Store International, 2004).

<sup>40</sup>Interview with Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan, Director of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group, held at Camp Crame, Quezon City on 1 April 2005.

<sup>41</sup>Alcun Papa, "Military: JI Members Still Training Locals", *Philippine Daily Inquirer* (18 January 2005).

<sup>42</sup> "Alleged bombs expert for Jemaah Islamiyah regional network arrested in Philippine", *Channel News Asia* at <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/138779/1/.html> <accessed on 12 April 2005>.

<sup>43</sup>Interview with General Marlu Quevedo, Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, held at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City on 29 March 2005.

<sup>44</sup>Jim Gomez, "Filipino Terror Group's Reach Grown Nationally", *Associated Press* (8 March 2005).

<sup>45</sup>Interview with Undersecretary Ricardo Blancaflor of the Philippines Anti-Terrorism Task Force held at Malacanang Palace, Manila on 21 March 2005.

<sup>46</sup> Jomar Canlas, "State Witness Bares MNLF, MILF Links with Abu Sayyaf", *The Manila Times* (28 March 2005).

<sup>47</sup>"AFP: Military operations in Sulu targeting ASG not MNLF", *ABS-CBN Interactive* (4 April 2007) at <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storyPage.aspx?storyId=75109>.

<sup>48</sup> Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

<sup>49</sup> "Gunning for Glory", *Al-Ahram Weekly Online* Issue No.548 (23 - 29 August 2001).

<sup>50</sup>"They [MILF] have not shown any proof that they have helped", *Newsbreak* (10 May 2004).

<sup>51</sup>"Gunning for Glory", op. cit.

<sup>52</sup>A paper obtained from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on 29 March 2005.

<sup>53</sup>Maria Ressa, "9/11: The Philippine Connection", Part 6 (September 2006) at <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=50160>.

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<sup>54</sup>See Benedicto R. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines”, *United States Institute of Peace Special Report*, No. 131 (January 2005).

<sup>55</sup>Simon Elegant, “The Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” *Time Asia* (30 August 2004).

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>In my personal interview with Ahmad Santos on 11 January 2007 in his prison cell in Bicutan, he said that he organized a movement called RSIM and not RSM or RSRM. He denied, however, having organized a terrorist group arguing that he was, in fact, a victim of state terrorism.

<sup>58</sup>Joe Cochrane, “Filipino Authorities Say The Newest Threat To The Country Is A Shadowy Terror Group Made Up Of Radical Muslim Converts”, *Newsweek International Edition* (17 May 2004) at <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4933472/> <accessed on 28 August 2004>.

<sup>59</sup>See Peter Chalk, , “Christian Converts and Islamic Terrorism in the Philippines”, *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 4, Issue 8 (20 April 2006) Also see International Crisis Group “Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts”, *Asia Report*, No. 110 (19 December 2005).

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

<sup>61</sup>Inday Espina-Varona, “Brothers in Arms”, *Philippine Graphics*, Vol. 15, No. 38 (28 February 2005), p. 24.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>64</sup>Interview with General Florencio D. Fianza of the Office of the Special Envoy on Transnational Crime on 1 April 2005.

<sup>65</sup>Department of National Defense, “Info Kit on the Abu Sayyaf Group” (Submitted to the Committee on National Defense and Security of the Philippine Senate on 24 August 2001).

<sup>66</sup>See International Peace Mission, *Basilan: The Next Afghanistan?* (Report of the International Peace Mission to Basilan, Philippines 23-27 March 2002), p. 11. Also at <http://www.bwf.org/pamayanan/peacemission.html> <accessed on 30 August 2004>.

<sup>67</sup>Madge Kho, “Fighting the Abu Sayyaf: A Pretext for U.S. Intervention In the Philippines” at <http://www.philippineupdate.com/madge.htm> <accessed on 12 May 2005>.

<sup>68</sup>Rommel C. Banlaoi, *War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (Manila: Rex Book Store International, 2004).

<sup>69</sup>The Philippine government formed the Cabinet Oversight Committee on International Security on 19 June 2001 through Executive Order No. 21. It is chaired by the Executive Security with the Secretary of National Defense as Vice-Chair.

<sup>70</sup>This section is largely based on Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Local Government Response Against Terrorist Threat in the Philippines: Issues and Prospects” (Paper prepared for presentation at the

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12<sup>th</sup> International Conference of the East and Southeast Asia Network for Highly Performing Local Governments organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Local Government Development Foundation, Rendezvous Hotel, Singapore on 2-3 December 2004).

<sup>71</sup>Inter-Agency Anti-Terrorism Task Force, "Government Response to Terrorism" (undated).

<sup>72</sup> League of Municipalities of the Philippines, Resolution Number 001-2002 (12-14 November 2002).

<sup>73</sup>"Mayors Vow to Lead Fight Vs Terrorism, Support National ID System", *Philippine Star* (22 October 2002).

<sup>74</sup> Jayme Arroyo, "Local gov t officials use 10-10-10 to clamor for release of IRA", *Cyberdyaryo* at [http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2001\\_1023\\_03.htm](http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2001_1023_03.htm) <accessed on 26 October 2004>.

<sup>75</sup>Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas (League of Philippine Villages), *Gabay ng Barangay Laban sa Terorismo (Villages Guide Against Terrorism)* (8 June 2004).

<sup>76</sup>Karl B. Kaufman, "Weak' Intel Blamed On Overzealous Spy Units", *The Manila Times* (26 March 2004) at [http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/mar/26/yehey/top\\_stories/20040326top6.html](http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/mar/26/yehey/top_stories/20040326top6.html) <accessed on 30 August 2004>.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid.

<sup>79</sup>For a complete copy of the report, see *Basilan: The Next Afghanistan?* (Report of the International Peace Mission to Basilan, Philippines 23-27 March 2002) at <http://www.bwf.org/pamayanan/peacemission.html> <accessed on 30 August 2004>.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid.

<sup>81</sup>ASG Combat Research and Study Group, "After Action Report" (Submitted to the Commanding General of the Philippine Army on 19 September 2001 by the Training and Doctrine Command of the Philippine Army).

<sup>82</sup>Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, *National Internal Security Plan (NISP)*, Version 3. RESTRICTED document. Quotations in this particular section come from this document, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>83</sup>Marichu Villanueva, "Palace Announces RP-CPP Peace Talks Resume in Oslo February 10-13", *The Philippine Star* (6 February 2004) at <http://www.newsflash.org/2003/05/hl/hl019815.htm> <accessed on 17 August 2004>.

<sup>84</sup>Department of National Defense "Talking Points on Abu Sayyaf Group" (17 November 2003). This document explains the use of SHA in countering the ASG.

<sup>85</sup>Department of National Defense, *Defense Planning Guidance, 2008-2013* (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, November 2006), p. 1.

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<sup>86</sup> Mark Turner, "The Management of Violence in a Conflict Organization: The Case of the Abu Sayyaf", *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 399.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid.

<sup>88</sup>Maelin Shipman, "Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information" (Paper presented to College of Health Sciences, Touro University International, 2003). Also available at <http://www.terrorismcentral.com/Library/terroristgroups/AbuSayyafGroup/ABUSAYYAFAnalysis.html> <accessed on 22 February 2006>.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid.

<sup>90</sup>For an excellent reader, see Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds), *Rebels, Warlords and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000).

<sup>91</sup> Shipman, "Abu Sayyaf: Analysis of Open Source Information" , op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>92</sup>Chaiwat Satha-Anand, "Mitigating the Success of Terrorism with the Politics of Truth and Justice" in *September 11 Political Freedom: Asian Perspectives 911*, Uwe Johannsen, Alan Smith and James Gomez, eds., (Singapore: Select Publishing, 2003), pp. 30-45.