

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**Combating Terrorism in Southeast Asia**  
**Applying the Anti-Communist Counterinsurgency Successes in**  
**Southeast Asia to Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism**

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

17 February 2006

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## **ABSTRACT**

Since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks, we have learned that Al-Qaeda linked and inspired radical Islamic terrorist organizations are operating throughout the world as part of a connected global insurgency. This insurgency emerged in Southeast Asia in a horrifying and undisputed way in October 2002 with a deadly bombing in Bali, Indonesia leaving over 200 dead and over 200 others injured. Since then, several Southeast Asia countries including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have wrestled with this challenge and have taken various measures to eliminate radical Islamic terrorism using lessons from years of counterinsurgency activities. This paper attempts to identify areas where the U.S. can expand its contributions in fighting this global insurgency, focusing primarily on Southeast Asia efforts and using lessons from past Southeast Asia counterinsurgency operations. Although the focus is combating radical Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, this paper also addresses implications for combating terrorism throughout the world using the Southeast Asia model.

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## INTRODUCTION

“Our enemy is twofold: al Qaeda, a stateless network of terrorists that struck us on 9/11; and a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al Qaeda, which has spawned terrorist groups and violence across the globe. The first enemy is weakened, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering...Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”<sup>1</sup>

9/11 Commission Report

Since Al-Qaeda’s declaration of war in 1998 against the United States and the West, the radical Islamic Jihadist movement has expanded into a worldwide conflict.<sup>2</sup> Bin Laden sees himself as the head of an international jihad confederation.<sup>3</sup> Al-Qaeda has now become a dynamic ideological movement that is part of a larger global insurgency.<sup>4</sup> As Robert D. Kaplan points out, “America is waging a counterinsurgency campaign not just in Iraq but against Islamic terror groups throughout the world.”<sup>5</sup> Al-Qaeda linked, radical Islamic terrorist organizations are now operating throughout the world including the heavily Muslim populated countries in Southeast Asia (SEA). The once narrowly focused, local SEA Islamic terrorist groups such as the Abu Syyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the infamous Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have now joined the ranks of the international Al-Qaeda movement creating a “second front” in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Considering the costly and complex challenges with fighting the GWOT or this global radical Islamic insurgency, are there useful models from the SEA anti-communist counterinsurgency (COIN) successes that can apply to the current efforts in combating Islamic terrorism in SEA and in other regions of the world, including Southwest Asia (SWA)?

In an effort to identify areas where the U.S. can expand its contribution to this global insurgency, focusing primarily on SEA and using operational lessons from the past, this paper will:

- (1) assess the nature of the problem, which is, the emergence of radical Islamic terrorism in SEA;
- (2) analyze three anti-communist counterinsurgency case studies from Malaysia, Philippines and

Indonesia; (3) extract the applicable lessons learned and common threads of success from the case studies; (4) build a model for countering the current Islamic insurgency in SEA; and (5) apply the model to a possible U.S. strategy to counter the global radical Islamic insurgency.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **Radical Islamic Terrorism in Southeast Asia.**

Islam was brought to Southeast Asia between the 13<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries by Arab, Persian and Indian traders and eventually spread through the conversions of the powerful and wealthy elites. As such, it developed very differently than in other regions of the Muslim world, where Islam was established and spread through Arab and Turkish military conquest.<sup>6</sup> The SEA region is ethnically and culturally diverse and Islam has for the most part been absorbed and integrated within the greater SEA cultures rather than dominating the religious, cultural, and political spheres as is the case in the Middle East. “They adapted Islam to their culture, rather than adapting their culture to Islam.”<sup>7</sup> Southeast Asia possesses the world’s largest Muslim population, with Indonesia possessing the largest Muslim population of any country in the world. Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei are Muslim dominated while countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Philippines and Cambodia have small minority Muslim populations.

Several developments have influenced the emergence of radical Islam in SEA over the past two decades. First is the injection of Middle Eastern Wahhabi and fundamentalist Islamic influence as a result of Saudi financial support to Islamic organizations, and the building of mosques and religious centers throughout the region that foster the more extreme versions of Islam. Over the past few decades, many SEA Muslims have had the opportunity to participate in the Hajj, as well as

receive education in Middle Eastern Universities, such as al-Azhar University in Cairo, that espouse and influence Jihadist thoughts and desires. Hundreds of SEA Muslims fought as Mujahideen fighters in the Soviet-Afghan war then of course returned to SEA as radicalized Jihadists.<sup>8</sup> Also, since the end of the Soviet-Afghan war and the rise of Al-Qaeda, hundreds of Southeast Asians have been recruited from Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore to attend terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and Mindanao.<sup>9</sup>

Muslim separatist movements such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, the Malay Muslims in Thailand and the Aceh Freedom movement in Indonesia began to emerge. In the early 1980s, the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) emerged in Malaysia and Indonesia. It began operating throughout SEA in an effort to establish a regional SEA Islamic Caliphate that would control the strategic region and its 420 million people. The Abu Sayyaf Group emerged in 1990 in the Philippines. Established as an Islamic separatist terrorist group in the Philippines, ASG operates in other SEA countries and is reported to have ties to both Al-Qaeda and JI.

The 1997-1998 economic crisis in SEA set the conditions for civilian deprivation and weak governments resulting in the rise of political and social unrest opening the door to the rise of radical Islamic groups throughout SEA. In Indonesia, the post Suharto “New Order” after 1998 reduced suppression and control, allowing increased activities of various separatist and Islamic political groups, including JI. With the conditions set, beginning in the late 1990s, in an effort to spread its worldwide Jihadist movement, Al-Qaeda sent operatives to SEA to train, resource and advise these local radical Islamic groups, specifically JI and ASG.

After the September 2001 attack on the United States’ World Trade Center and Pentagon, most of the SEA countries were indifferent to the United States’ call for a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Most SEA countries believed they were immune from this global networked insurgency and that their conflicts were internal and not related to the Al-Qaeda led global Jihad. However,

SEA experienced a great awakening after the bloody October 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia after investigations revealed that suspects connected to the bombing were from radical Islamic groups from different countries located throughout SEA. Since October 2002 SEA has experienced deadly bombings in Jakarta, Indonesia in 2003 and 2004, another bombing in Bali in 2005 and increased separatist violence in Aceh, Indonesia, the Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand. Clearly, the global radical Islamic insurgency has emerged very strong in Southeast Asia.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Three Historical Southeast Asia Counterinsurgency Approaches**

As we consider the possibilities for countering Southeast Asia's terrorist problems, this region has numerous historical examples of successful COIN that could offer insights and lessons for countering this modern insurgency. Lets us review three successful SEA COIN examples.

#### **The Malaysian Case: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960**

Communist guerrillas began insurgency operations in 1948 in the British colony of Malaya. The largely Chinese based Malayan Communist Party began using terror to gain support among the country's Chinese minority population. The aim was to drive out the British and establish a communist republic. At first, the British considered the insurgency primarily a military issue and tried to defeat the guerrillas conventionally using large-scale military operations and police law enforcement techniques. The government outlawed the communist party and created a registration program requiring all people to maintain a national ID card. They placed curfews and conducted checkpoints, raids and patrols in effort to defeat and disrupt insurgent operations. The police



arrested thousands of known communists, holding them indefinitely. The government increased the police force from 9000 to 43,000 and doubled the size of the army.<sup>10</sup> Believing that the communist insurgents were receiving most of their support from the numerous Chinese immigrant villages, the British executed a program of moving the Chinese to separate and secure settlements. By 1952 about a half a million Chinese immigrants had been resettled in over 400 new secured villages.<sup>11</sup> Although these initial emergency efforts stalled the insurgency, such draconian efforts alienated the people, increased tension between the Malaysian and Chinese populations and created stronger bonds between the communist insurgents and the people.

Under the leadership of the new British High Commissioner, Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer, the government adjusted its counterinsurgency strategy, creating a strategy that was based on “winning the hearts and minds” of the Malaysian people.<sup>12</sup> In addition to military and law enforcement approaches, the British strategy included using cultural, political, economic and spiritual factors to defeat the insurgency.<sup>13</sup> The goal was to improve the security and quality of life for all people while discrediting the communist efforts.

Military operations shifted to decentralized small-scale actions that consisted of police and military roadblocks and checkpoints to search for insurgents, supplies and weapons while lethal jungle patrols, raids and ambushes continued as a critical part of the COIN program. Captured insurgents were interrogated and evaluated. Violent insurgents were held, but many were sent to re-education centers and then released and given jobs, land and opportunity.

However, as Richard Clutterbuck concluded, “the real key to the government’s success was that it concentrated its attention on the people in the villages rather than on the guerrillas, whom they regarded as clandestine political organizers rather than fighters.”<sup>14</sup> The intent was to create division between the people and the communist insurgents. The first priority was to establish security for the communities. Police conducted internal security of the villages while the military

secured the outer areas to prevent attack and influence. Eventually, the British trained and equipped over 400,000 home guards to assist in the local security of the villages. Critical to the program was retraining and educating the police and military on proper and decent treatment of the people they serve. The government did not tolerate mistreatment of the citizens or breaking the law. The government also improved the overall competence level of the security forces.

The British developed a “Special Branch” of the military that was responsible for intelligence collection and dissemination. The British provided the management and oversight but the operators were trusted local Malays and Chinese, recruited as agents and informants against the insurgents and those who supported them. The government paid substantial rewards for useful information that lead to killing or capturing insurgents.<sup>15</sup>

Templer and his government officials regularly went out among the population to assess the issues, listen to the concerns of the people and spread his philosophy about how to defeat the insurgency and improve the conditions of the country.<sup>16</sup> As a result of this constant assessment process, quality of life improvements began to emerge. The government built programs to develop roads, clean water supplies, sanitation and electricity to the towns and villages. Hospitals, schools and worship centers began to spring up within the communities. The government improved basic education programs and expanded opportunity to attend institutes of higher learning.<sup>17</sup> From this progress and development grew confidence and commitment among the people and an increased level of civil sensibility and pride. The insurgents could not match or counter the visible progress in the security and development the people were experiencing.<sup>18</sup>

The government established programs to increase pride in a united and free Malaysia and the promise of self-government that reflected the “Malayan way of life.”<sup>19</sup> As part of this effort, the government provided immigrant citizenship to over 3 million people including the Chinese squatters.<sup>20</sup> For the first time, locally elected village governments began to emerge. In 1952, the

country began a move toward self-rule at every level from the villages, districts and States to the national level. By 1957, Malaysia completed federal elections and received full independence.<sup>21</sup>

Another critical requirement for countering the Malayan insurgency was denying the insurgents access to food and supplies by securing the villages and then identifying and arresting the food suppliers. These arrests lead to intelligence that allowed police and military to ambush insurgents on the supply routes or pick up points. Relying heavily on trusted informers and recruited agents, the government was able to successfully interdict supply lines. Starving and in need of supplies, as the insurgents moved about to seek out new suppliers they exposed themselves to arrest or military action.<sup>22</sup>

The British used effective information operations to increase the public awareness and promote its efforts to help support them and defeat the communists, as well as, conduct psychological operations against the guerrillas to show that their efforts were not working and their success was in doubt. Through effective open information flow, from local media support, leaflets, newspapers and public radio broadcasts, the government was able to focus attention on the communist's broken promises and the government's kept promises with positive results. As the country prospered, eventually movie theaters entered the country and the use of newsreels improved information dissemination. Finally, the government used information to offer hope to the demoralized and starving guerrillas by promising them good treatment if they surrendered and re-entered the community as positive participants.<sup>23</sup>

The government also created improved economic conditions for most of the country by expanding industry, increasing the rubber and tin industries, as well as, creating land and agriculture reform. Such actions greatly facilitated the seeds of prosperity and hope throughout the country.<sup>24</sup> Although a lengthy and difficult effort, in July 1960 the Malaysian government announced the end of the emergency in countering the communist insurgency.

### **The Philippine Case. The HUK Insurrection 1946-1955.**

In 1946, shortly after the defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese from the Philippines, one of the communist guerrilla organizations fighting against the Japanese, the Hukbalahap (known as the HUKs) initiated an insurrection to take over the Philippines. Post war Philippines was in economic ruin, the military and government had become corrupt and abusive toward the population. In this situation, the HUKs refused to turn over their arms to the government and began to rapidly gain control of the people, particularly in Luzon. The HUK recruited its members from various backgrounds, but mostly from the deprived uneducated peasants and laborers. The insurgents received their support from within the communities and possessed weapons left over from World War II guerrilla operations against the Japanese.

As the HUK rebellion began to move toward a successful take over, in September 1950, the corrupt Philippine President, Elpidio Quirino, appointed Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of the Department of National Defense. Given enormous authority, Magsaysay believed that in order to defeat the insurgency, he must not only defeat the HUKs in combat but must also cut them off from their source of support and power by gaining the support, confidence and allegiance of the Filipino people. As part of these objectives, Magsaysay wanted the military to become a major part of a large, coordinated development plan for the country that would incorporate the military as a participant in social reforms and public service, along with its security responsibilities.<sup>25</sup> To do this he had to restructure the military as it was suffering from low morale and ineffectiveness as a result of poor leadership and corruption. One of Magsaysay's most significant acts in reshaping the military was personally traveling extensively to visit the soldiers on the ground to determine the exact issues and problems, as well as improve morale and confidence in the troops.<sup>26</sup> He replaced leaders throughout all levels of the military. With significant financial assistance from the United

States, he increased soldier pay and nearly tripling the size of the military. He began to retrain the members of the military to recognize that they existed to protect and support the people of the country. He instilled in each soldier the duty of being ambassadors of good will toward the people, while combating the HUKs.<sup>27</sup> He severely punished those who committed crimes or abuses against the people. The new professional Philippine military gave the soldiers a sense of importance and a feeling of nationalism, which led to their positive support in fighting the HUKs and protecting the citizens.

With help from U.S. military advisors, Magsaysay restructured and retrained the Army to operate in smaller organizations to more effectively counter the HUK small unit tactics. Recognizing the need for a unified effort in fighting the insurgency, Magsaysay placed the national police under the control of the Army. He divided the Philippines into four security sectors and dispersed small independent units throughout these sectors to seek out, defeat and disrupt HUK groups.<sup>28</sup> Such operations were around the clock and included actions deep within the jungle areas.

Magsaysay understood the importance of actionable intelligence. In support of the police and military operations, Magsaysay created civilian commando or home guard units to help secure the villages targeted by HUK guerrillas. As security and public confidence in the military improved, the military began to rely more and more on human intelligence to help with locating and destroying HUK elements and bases of operations. They were able to determine the sources of supplies and logistics routes and interdicted them, resulting in significantly reducing the HUKs ability to sustain its influence. He paid rewards for providing information on the HUK operations and information leading to the arrest or death of senior HUK leaders. The military was able to obtain enormous intelligence from captured HUK guerrillas and their family members simply through treating them humanely.<sup>29</sup>

Magsaysay began a comprehensive information campaign with the Philippine people explaining that the military was changing its ways and was there to protect them. He began an aggressive anti-HUK propaganda program in an effort to reduce popular support. Leaflets were dropped over starving and demoralized HUKs in an effort to influence their surrender.

Magsaysay's message to the HUKs was clear, "As guardians of our nation's safety, it is our duty to hunt you down and kill you if you do not surrender. But as fellow Filipinos, we would rather help you return to a happy Filipino way of life."<sup>30</sup>

As part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy, Magsaysay developed the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR). The objective of EDCOR was to improve the economic conditions for the Pilipino people, but more importantly return former HUKs back to and positively participate in the general Philippine society. Ensuring each was treated with dignity and respect, each HUK was reeducated and trained on reentering as a positive productive member of the community and then given free land for farming. Most of this civil resettlement project for former HUKs occurred on the Island of Mindinao but eventually spread to other parts of the Philippines. The Army supported this effort by providing security and helping the settlers develop their communities by clearing land, building homes and administrative facilities and establishing public utilities. The program continued to grow and eventually expanded into a general land reform program for the peasant population.<sup>31</sup> This extremely popular program completely undermined HUK efforts and was the primary ingredient that led to its eventual collapse.

Throughout this campaign, the United States provided significant support to the Philippine government through the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). Support included military support such as military trainers and advisors, multi-million dollar financial aid packages and military equipment and supplies. As the Philippine strategy shifted from a narrow military focus to a more holistic approach that focused on improving the political-economic

conditions, the U.S. moved JUSMAG from control of the Commander in Chief Pacific to the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines.<sup>32</sup>

Between 1951 and 1954, the U.S. provided the Philippines with nearly \$95 million in non-military economic aid which allowed the Philippine government to improve the economic conditions and general welfare of the people.<sup>33</sup> With this support, the government was able to build roads, highways, schools, hospitals and public utilities, as well as, improve public education for the Filipino people. Economic conditions improved through increased markets, especially in the agricultural areas. Finally, by 1953, Magsaysay was able to help influence restructuring the political system, creating secure and free elections from the local to national levels. Through his dedicated efforts, the people elected him president of the Philippines.

By 1955, the HUKs, with all public support lost, ceased to be a credible threat in the Philippines. Through a combination of lethal military actions, restructuring the military and governmental organizations, and dramatically improving domestic social and economic conditions, Magsaysay with the help of significant U.S. military and financial assistance, was able to defeat the Hukbalahap insurrection.

### **The Indonesian Case. “The 30 September Movement”, 30 September-2 October 1965.**

In very sharp contrast to the Malaysian and Philippine COIN approaches, the Indonesian COIN approach in 1965-1966, while successful was extremely brutal in execution and intent. Although rich in resources and culture, post World War II Indonesia struggled with poor post war conditions, the threat of a return of European colonialism, and internal societal tensions. Even after winning independence in 1945, poor conditions continued in Indonesia. The economy and infrastructure began to collapse. The communist alternative began to take hold in the country with the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The PKI was established in the 1920s and had

been increasing in power over the years through both positive influence and intimidation and emerged as a significant political force by the late 1950s.<sup>34</sup> Although not a proclaimed communist, the Indonesian President, Sukarno was very anti West and maintained ties with communist countries such as China. He began to believe that the PKI could assist him in maintaining power and improve Indonesia's power and influence.<sup>35</sup> Although a legendary Indonesian figure who helped lead the country to independence, Sukarno relied on the powerful and mostly pro-West Indonesian military to remain in power. By the mid-1960s both the military and PKI had gained considerable power but were ideological enemies.

By 1964, the PKI began moving toward seizing full power in Indonesia, allying with President Sukarno who began openly leading the nation toward becoming a communist state.<sup>36</sup> The PKI began recruiting support throughout the country and began forming militia units (a Fifth Force) in the PKI controlled regions and villages.<sup>37</sup> Believing they had popular support, on 30 September 1965, with Sukarno's passive support the PKI launched a coup to eliminate Indonesia's top military leaders. After successfully executing six key generals, the PKI moved to secure the country. However, a relatively obscure field commander, Major General Haji Mohamed Suharto, rallied the Indonesian Army and crushed the rebellion within 72 hours of its execution. Cleverly leaving Sukarno in as the figurehead president, General Suharto took control of the government and outlawed the PKI. He seized the country's communications and media networks and began to publish anti-PKI propaganda, calling for the arrest and death of communist members and ethnic Chinese immigrants. Playing on nationalistic and religious feelings, Suharto was able to excite the population to the point of frenzy, resulting in the arrest of thousands of PKI members and between 200,000 and 500,000 deaths within just six months.<sup>38</sup> In March 1966, Suharto successfully persuaded President Sukarno to authorize him to restore security, which effectively transferred executive authority to Suharto. In August 1966, Suharto developed his two-part strategy for the



“New Order”, which was (1) establish security and stability and (2) develop methods for economic development.<sup>39</sup> By the end of 1966, the PKI essentially ceased to exist as a credible influence in Indonesia. In 1967, the Indonesian parliament appointed Suharto acting President. He was elected full President by the parliament in 1968 and remained President until 1998.

With the PKI crushed and security reestablished throughout the Indonesia, Suharto was able to focus attention on economic development and improved conditions for the Indonesian people. Using essentially a post conflict “winning the hearts and minds” strategy, he routinely traveled throughout the country to connect with the “common people”, to understand their problems and gain their confidence and support.<sup>40</sup> During his early rule, Indonesia experienced unprecedented growth and development. Suharto placed special emphasis on improving the economy as his “core priority”.<sup>41</sup> His programs and policies significantly reduced inflation, increased exports, lowered government spending and over time, reduced the national debt.<sup>42</sup> Economic success resulted from substantial foreign aid and investment, especially from the United States. He promoted foreign private sector investment, including oil production, agriculture and manufacturing. As a direct result of the international investment and expanded economy, Suharto’s government improved conditions such as developing roads and irrigation systems, public utilities and improving agriculture and food production. The government also made social improvements, expanding health and educational facilities and family planning programs.

Suharto reorganized the Indonesian military through a concept he called “redisciplining the military”.<sup>43</sup> This program included restructuring the military organization so as to make it more responsive to the government and supportive of the people it served. He reorganized and retrained the officer corps and restructured the military based on western military models.<sup>44</sup> The Indonesian military was required to maintain a lower profile within the communities it protected and be less overbearing with the people. Suharto eliminated the practice of the military taxing the people and

communities under its protection.<sup>45</sup> Keeping the military aligned with the government, Suharto required the military to possess a “dual function”, the defense and security of the country and also the duty to protect the social and political order.<sup>46</sup> This dual function carried over into the economic areas as military officers were encouraged to participate in Indonesian businesses in order to maintain some level of control and influence over the economy, which became essential to national stability.<sup>47</sup> He created special military intelligence and security forces to counter PKI or other “extremist or subversive” groups to ensure stability and the security of the government.<sup>48</sup>

Committed to government reform, but keeping in mind the Indonesia’s multiethnic, multicultural-religious makeup, Suharto moved Indonesia toward a form of democracy that was participative but controlled. Building on Sukarno’s “guided democracy”, Suharto’s “Pantjasila democracy” was based on five principles—God, humanity, nationalism, representative government and social justice. He struck a balance between individual rights, the rights of the larger population and the needs of the state. Under this form of democracy, many political organizations and beliefs were not allowed and were suppressed by the Suharto government.<sup>49</sup>

In an effort to restore Indonesia’s relations with the Western world, which had deteriorated under Sukarno, Suharto rejoined the United Nations (UN) and froze diplomatic ties with Communist China, whom Suharto believed had aided and supported the PKI. In addition, he instituted a good neighbor program to reestablish positive relations with neighboring countries and helped develop a regional economic and political alliance called the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a powerful SEA regional organization still in existence today.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Lessons Learned and Common Threads to Successful Counterinsurgency Operations in Southeast Asia

Though different, these three counterinsurgency approaches were successful in either eliminating or marginalizing rather powerful communist insurgencies threatening to take over these countries. The Malaysian approach involved a colonial power (the British) using its resources to regain security and control within the country, using a combination hard military and winning the hearts and minds approach to eliminate the communist insurgency and eventually transition the country to stability, prosperity and self-rule. The Philippine approach used a similar strategy but involved an established national government with help from an outside power (the United States) to defeat the insurrection. In sharp contrast, although the insurgency was put down in short order, the Indonesian approach was entirely indigenous, extremely brutal and highly questionable in terms of large-scale human rights abuses. Correcting the root causes of the Indonesian insurrection were not addressed until after the threat was eliminated, whereas in the Malaysian and Philippine cases, both security and economic actions were pursued essentially simultaneously. The end state in all three COIN approaches was to break the insurgents' will, undermine their efforts and turn popular opinion away from them.

After analyzing the three cases, several common successful threads emerge that can be used in creating a useful model for conducting successful COIN operations (see figure 1.). These common COIN components were not executed in sequential order, so there is no indication that they should be executed sequentially in current or future operations. However, they are listed in order of priority.

1. Establish security and order. The first priority in all three counterinsurgency cases was to establish security and order within the country and most importantly within the towns and villages,

specifically those areas vulnerable to insurgent influence or control. This was accomplished through overwhelming and aggressive military and police efforts requiring large numbers of trained and equipped forces.

2. Isolate insurgents from the population. The governments first identified and then deliberately separated the insurgents from their target populations. These were communities where either the insurgents were influencing the local population or they were receiving active or passive support. The population became the center of gravity in fighting the insurgency, specifically those populations vulnerable to providing active or passive support. The governments outlawed the communist groups and arrested insurgents. They either moved entire populations away from the insurgent areas or moved or forced insurgents out of the populated areas. With the exception of the Indonesian model, the governments attempted to forgive and grant amnesty to insurgents if they agreed to reenter society and comply with its expectations, thus undermining the insurgents' cause.

3. Professionalize and retrain military and police personnel. The governments adjusted military and police officer attitudes and behavior regarding the need for them to defend and protect the people they serve rather than abusing and threatening them. They improved technical and tactical proficiencies, as well as, increased pay for military members. Such improvements increased the military's competency and esprit de corps which increased public support and confidence, ultimately improving their overall social standing within the country.

4. Institute programs to remove the feeling of hopelessness from the people. This deals with Templer's concept of winning hearts and minds that focuses on the underlying causes of the insurgencies, which in the three cases involved social, political and economic deprivations and grievances. Again, the focus was on influencing the center of gravity—the people. The governments were able to influence public opinion in their favor and away from the insurgent causes. They improved people's economic standing through improved job opportunities, pay, and

expanded markets. They improved infrastructure and access to basic essential utilities and necessities in the local communities. The government leaders increased access to medical resources and improved medical facilities. Property ownership to all, including the poor became a reality. They increased and improved public education and access to education. Again, such measures undermined the insurgents' cause and popular support for the insurgency.

5. Improve intelligence collection and dissemination. Critical to successful COIN operations was the use of spies, paid informants and rewards for information. As security and confidence among the people improved the more the people were willing to come forward to provide critical information.

6. Cut off resources and supplies to the insurgents. A key aspect of COIN strategy was to cut off insurgent resources. Through improved intelligence information, the governments were able to determine where the insurgents received logistics support from within the communities, from throughout the country and from outside the country. As a result, logistic centers were shut down and supply lines cut, choking off the insurgents' ability to operate effectively and reducing their will to continue the effort.


7. Conduct lethal military operations to kill or capture insurgents to disrupt or destroy their operations. Such operations included security checkpoints, searches, security patrols, raids and ambushes and deliberate attacks. The intent was to destroy command and control capabilities and organizational infrastructure, as well as, interdict or prevent insurgent tactical operations.

8. Government reform. In each case the people observed a change in government that appeared more participative, especially at the local level. The people viewed the new governments as responsive to their needs rather than as abusive and indifferent to the problems and concerns of the people. Such reforms contributed greatly to undermining the legitimacy of the insurgency.

9. Information Operations. The governments clearly used all available modes of communication and information delivery including national media, community leaders and representatives to promote positive government image, increase public support, undermine insurgent operations and demoralize the insurgents.

10. Unified multi-agency and multi-organization participation under a single authority. The counter insurgency efforts were military led interagency operations. Although the operations were a combination of military, political, social and economic efforts, the military played a key role in coordinating the various governmental and international organizations to overcome the insurgencies. All efforts were a part of a greater strategy, controlled by a single authority.

This model (outlined in figure), created from the common successes of the SEA COIN operations, coincides with D. Michael Shafer’s prescriptions for winning counterinsurgency operations. Shafer argues that along with defeating the insurgents, successful COIN operations requires three essential *oughts*--security, good government, and progress.<sup>50</sup>



**Figure One**

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Applying the lessons learned to Terrorism in Southeast Asia

“The most innovative and sophisticated thinking about Islam is taking place in areas outside the Arab world such as Southeast Asia. The US should pay attention to these progressive developments because they can counter the more extreme interpretations of Islam held in some parts of the Arab world.”<sup>51</sup>

US Strategy in the Muslim World After 9/11, Rand 2004

Before we can apply the SEA counterinsurgency model and lessons learned to the modern radical Islamic terrorism challenge in SEA, there are additional significant cultural, economic and religious realities influencing the “underlying conditions or “root causes” of radical Islamic terrorism that must be considered. These underlying conditions essentially deal with certain critical needs that are not being met.

If we accept Abraham Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory, all people, regardless of location, religion, culture, race or ethnicity, desire the most common and basic of needs. We all want to live in a safe and secure environment that allows us to make a living to support ourselves and our families. All people desire basic needs such as shelter, eatable food, clean water and access to medical care. Most people desire education for their children and an opportunity to pursue a better quality of life. The lack of security, welfare, and opportunity leads to loss of hope, which leads to frustration and anger that create the conditions for radical manipulation, and terrorist or insurgent influence. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, states that underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for exploitation.<sup>52</sup> As stated by President George W. Bush, “Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”<sup>53</sup> In spite of economic growth and development, Southeast Asia continues to struggle with corruption, religious conflict

and poverty. Such conditions are being exploited by illegal drug traders, radical groups and terrorists in an effort to gain positive support of the people or instilling fear.

Another consideration in countering radical Islamic terrorism in SEA is understanding the importance of the Muslim identity. Islam is a way of life and extends into the cultural, political and societal spheres that must not be overlooked or dismissed. For Muslims, to be Muslim is a source of pride and identity that transcends national pride and identity. For many Muslims, including many in SEA, the Islamic faith and its laws supersede that of the State and therefore, ultimately the best solution is the creation of an Islamic State.

Finally, for hundreds of years Muslims have endured and fought against domination, colonization and influence from outside powers. Muslims view such periods as times of oppression and humiliation. Today, as the world experiences fast-paced Western dominated globalization and modernization, many Muslims perceive this as being at odds with and a threat to Islam, causing rejection in the form of a resurgence of Islamic fundamental values with the radical elements emerging promoting a defensive Jihad.<sup>54</sup>

Thomas Friedman suggests that the Muslim world has lagged behind the rest of the world and in many cases deprives its people of good government, modern education, quality jobs, and hope in fulfilling their full potential. Living in a modern “flat world” they are able to see where they stand in relation to the rest of the world and become frustrated and humiliated.<sup>55</sup> This sense of frustration and humiliation among many in the Muslim world, including the Muslim populations in SEA must be understood and acknowledged as an important underlying condition that fosters radical Islam terrorism.



## **Current Southeast Asian Programs and Initiatives to Counter a New Insurgency.**

The anti-communist counter insurgency efforts in SEA went well beyond simply the military component and involved all areas of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME). Many of these COIN lessons are still used today throughout SEA in countering the growing radical Islamic terrorist and separatist movements. The Philippines is leading the way in modern SEA counterinsurgency operations. Focusing primarily on the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Moro separatist operations, using the COIN concept as the foundation, the Philippine government has developed a very comprehensive 14-point strategy and 16-point program to fight terrorist and insurgency efforts in the Philippines.<sup>56</sup> The Philippine programs work toward professionalizing, training and equipping the police and military to provide the best security and protection possible in the villages and communities.

Expanding on the past successes of winning the hearts and minds, the Philippine government with the help from the United States is striving to improve economic conditions and infrastructure in the areas and communities subject to the influence of the ASG and other groups. Recognizing that its governmental bureaucracies have not always efficiently supported the people, the Philippine government is striving to become more transparent, accountable and responsive to the Filipino people.<sup>57</sup> Since 2001, the Philippine government through the help of U.S. military assistance and military trainers has campaigned to “prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence”, which has met with tremendous success.<sup>58</sup> In an effort to reform and modernize, the Philippine military has benefited greatly from the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to train and educate its military personnel, as well as the U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program for purchasing updated military equipment. Through the efforts of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) the U.S. military has worked closely with the Philippine military during combined joint training

exercises, humanitarian assistance efforts and infrastructure improvements within the country. In 2002, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, using effective COIN methods of combining security and humanitarian operations, joint combined American-Philippine military forces successfully cleared ASG from its base of operations on Basilan Island. Through this close relationship, the U.S. now recognizes the Philippines as an official Non-NATO ally.<sup>59</sup>

The Muslim country of Indonesia has been much slower in its counter terrorism programs against radical Islamic terrorism. After the 1998 economic crisis and the fall of the Suharto government, Indonesian governments have adopted an almost appeasement style approach that has allowed radical Islamic groups to operate more freely throughout the country. However, beginning somewhat with President Megawati Sukarnoputri (23 Jul 01 to 20 Oct 04) and very strongly by the current President, retired Army General Susilo Yudhoyono, the Indonesian government has become concerned that the radical movement is now taking advantage of its loosened controls and may be undermining and threatening the government.<sup>60</sup> Shortly after 9/11, President Megawati with her Minister of Security and future president, Yudhoyono began improving ties with the U.S. and increasing Indonesian resolve to counter terrorist operations, specifically the radical separatist groups such as Laskar Jihad and JI. Moving special military and police forces into the areas where these groups operate, the government has been able to restore security, isolate the extremist groups and work toward focusing attention on the root causes of the conflict. These efforts resulted in shutting down Laskar Jihad.

After the October 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government hardened its resolve to eliminate terrorism in its country. The Bali bombings prompted a government crackdown on extremists, which created a greater willingness by the secular politicians and moderate Muslims to challenge the radicals.<sup>61</sup> With the backing of the military and the two most prominent moderate Muslim Political parties, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the government set in motion

its new counter terrorism program. It called for the arrest of all terrorist members and authorized the authorities to hold suspects up to a week without charges and as long as required if intelligence information supported it. As a result, numerous terrorist cells were uncovered and several JI members and leaders, including JI leader Abu Bashir Bakar, were arrested, disrupting JI and AQ plans to initiate a religious war and establish an Islamic State.

After actively entering the global war on terrorism, the Indonesian government has improved relations with Australia, through military and law enforcement cooperation and exchange of vital intelligence information. In July 2004 Indonesia partnered with Australia in developing the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation. The purpose of the Center is to enhance the operational expertise of regional law enforcement personnel in dealing with transnational crime and terrorism.<sup>62</sup>

With the U.S. lifting some restrictions against Jakarta, Indonesia has benefited greatly from the U.S. IMET program for training and professionalizing its military. Recently, the U.S. has lifted its embargo on arms sales to Indonesia. Following the October 2005 Bali bombings, Indonesia began cracking down on schools that teach extremism and militant ideas and is developing programs to create government financed public education. The government went on the information offensive to influence popular opinion against radical Islamic ideology. As a result of the Indonesian government's initiatives, most Indonesians reject radical Islam and terrorist organizations within their country. In November 2005, an important member of JI, Azahari bin Husin was killed during a fight with U.S. trained Indonesian special police forces. Azahari was one of the primary leaders and planners of the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, as well as the 2003 and 2004 bombings in Jakarta.<sup>63</sup> Although terrorist acts continue as evidenced by the October 2005 Bali bombings, radical Islam in Indonesia appears to be in decline for the moment.<sup>64</sup>

Indonesia, with assistance from the international community, has taken advantage of the large Tsunami humanitarian relief efforts in Aceh to create conditions for lasting peace and cooperation. In August 2005 a peace agreement between Aceh and the Indonesian government appears to be taking hold, as insurgent forces have disarmed, Indonesian security forces are withdrawing and Aceh has officially begun participation in the Indonesian government. However, issues such as post Tsunami devastation, high unemployment, poverty, police corruption and integration of insurgents back into the communities continue to threaten this fragile peace in the area.<sup>65</sup>

In addition to his leadership in helping to resolve the Aceh conflict, President Yudhoyono has stated that he seeks to reform and modernize Indonesia's governmental institutions, remove corruption, reform the Indonesian military, reduce poverty and increase economic prosperity in an effort to remove the conditions that create unrest in his country.<sup>66</sup>

However, as Angel Rabasa points out, "whether this new found resolve will be sustained, and whether the shift in the wider public mood will fundamentally alter the pattern of political competition in Indonesia, remains an open question."<sup>67</sup> The people of this Muslim country, though mostly moderate and tolerant, continue to possess ill feelings toward the West and the United States. The country continues to possess radical extremists and has yet to establish control over the flow of resources to radical groups. The country's various separatist movements and sectarian struggles, especially in Aceh, Poso in Central Sulawesi and Maluku continue to threaten the stability of the country. Economic depression and accusations of police and military abuse against the population continue in parts of the country.

As with Indonesia, Malaysia's support to the GWOT was initially slow, as Kuala Lumpur also has to pursue a careful and cautious approach not to upset or alienate its majority Muslim population. However, when the October 2002 Bali bombings investigation suggested links to

terrorist cells and leaders from Malaysia, the Malaysian government began to formulate a more proactive counter terrorist program. It was able to gain the support of the mostly moderate population, isolating and marginalizing the dominant Islamic fundamentalist party, Pan-Malay Islamic Party (PAS). Also, the government has been able to freeze assets of radical and terrorist groups, arrest numerous local radical and AQ terrorist members, and crack down on immigration procedures. The government has taken steps to professionalize and train the police department in an effort to make it more effective in combating terrorism and crime as well as being more supportive of the communities it serves.

As a result of its support in GWOT, Malaysia has continued its U.S. economic partnerships and investments resulting in billions of dollars in trade. Its military has also benefited in significant U.S. IMET support. This economic and military stability has had positive impact on the overall stability within the country. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, the Malaysian government strongly desires to reduce radical Islamic ideology and improve overall education of the Malaysian people in order to increase its ability to participate in the growing global economy. Under this vision, Malaysia has reorganized its educational system that controls religious teachings and promotes modern education that arms students with the necessary tools and abilities to participate in the modern world. As a relatively wealthy nation, it has worked to improve higher standards of living and eliminate poverty throughout the country, specifically in the ethnic Malay areas that have not progressed well over the years. Malaysia's primary focus in fighting radical Islamic terrorism is to stress the proper interpretation of Islam as a religion of peace and to promote Malaysia as a model Islamic nation that is moderate, progressive and tolerant. This promotion of moderate Islam is an enormously significant aspect of the Malaysian approach that is supported and openly advocated by the Malaysian Government in international forums, which is rarely observed in the Muslim world.<sup>68</sup>

In addition, regional cooperation among SEA countries in combating terrorism is extraordinary. In an effort to promote effective regional security and cooperation, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines are all critical participants in ASEAN and the Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEA-CAT). In addition, the three countries signed an agreement for exchanging information and intelligence, and working together to secure the borders, including monitoring hundreds of islands and the surrounding waterways.

### **United States Support in Countering Terrorism in Southeast Asia.**

“We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power—diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military.”<sup>69</sup>

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003

With the fast-paced spread of globalization, the SEA region is emerging as a vital U.S. national interest, perhaps as vital as the Middle East. Its strategic and economic importance is significant. ASEAN is the United States’ third-largest trading partner.<sup>70</sup> The Malacca Straits are vital shipping lanes for the global economy. This important region, though mostly moderate, possesses a large portion of the world’s Muslim population that is vulnerable to radicalism and Al-Qaeda influence. However, this part of the Muslim world, through its actions, appears to embrace moderate Islam, tolerance and movement in the direction of modernization and globalization. There is a great opportunity here to assist the SEA countries in defeating radical movements and truly becoming a model for overcoming the global Jihadist insurgency.

While considered the “second front” against global terrorism, the United States should certainly continue to support this region as a major priority. As a matter of policy, the U.S. should continue efforts to embrace the willing SEA governments and assist them with their efforts to combat Islamic insurgent activities in their countries. Perhaps the most critical countries or “key

states” are Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Indonesia and Malaysia are critical due to their economic and geographic importance to the United States and they possess a significant portion of the world’s Muslim population that is under threat of radical influence. The Philippines on the other hand is an important regional ally that has demonstrated difficulty with countering radical Islamic terrorist groups within the country, especially in Mindanao and surrounding areas in the Southern Philippines. If groups such as JI and ASG are allowed to regain a foothold in the Philippines, they could use the Philippines as a base to threaten SEA neighbors, including Muslim Indonesia and Malaysia.

Using the SEA COIN model, where can the United States best focus attention in assisting with countering radical Jihadist terrorism in SEA? First, the COIN lessons from SEA fit very well in supporting the United States policy on combating terrorism especially in support of the 4D strategy of defeat, deny, diminish and defend outlined in the National Strategy for combating Terrorism.<sup>71</sup> The Southeast Asia COIN model also falls within the strategy outlined in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism.<sup>72</sup> Although the U.S. policy and strategy recognizes all instruments of national power, it emphasizes the “hard” military option as the primary instrument for combating terrorism. The lessons from SEA COIN operations teach us that successful counterinsurgency operations must possess more than the single focus of military attack and disrupt actions but also focus priority efforts in correcting the political, economic and cultural grievances that feed the insurgency.

As we pursue our overall strategy in supporting SEA efforts to counter radical Islamic terrorism, the U.S. efforts must support from “behind the scenes”. With most governments in SEA relatively stable, it is important for the U.S. to operate in a supportive and cooperative mode and not be perceived by the governments and the populous as attempting to control, intimidate or manipulate them.

With this in mind, considering all elements of U.S. national power to undermine radical Islamic terrorism, spearheaded by the Department of State (DOS), the U.S must continue to support governmental reform that provides for the security and general welfare of all their citizens while recognizing human rights for all segments of their societies. While experiencing relatively good cooperation in the war on terrorism, it is time that the United States open all diplomatic and economic channels with Indonesia and Malaysia. It is time to recognize the Malaysian government's efforts in creating moderate Islam within Malaysia and promote this as a model for other Muslim nations. Also, Indonesia should be given a great deal of credit for its recent tough and effective work in combating terrorist cells within its borders.

Through the DOS, USAID and the Department of Commerce (DOC), the U.S. must continue to facilitate improved economic conditions and free trade, and support educational programs that will assist the SEA countries in industrial, technological and economic advancement while undermining narrowly focused radical religious schools and teachings. As evidenced by the recent successful U.S. support to the SEA Tsunami humanitarian relief efforts that have contributed to reducing tension in Aceh, the U.S. should continue to remain committed and ready to provide aid and assistance as needed to impoverished areas of SEA that are breeding grounds for radicalization.

Along with bilateral initiatives, using our soft power influence, the U.S. must continue fostering good regional cooperation between the SEA countries. Facilitating economic development, security cooperation, intelligence sharing and law enforcement partnerships within the region will lead to further isolating the insurgents and strengthening security for the people. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and APEC are currently effective forums for creating regional security, and political and economic cooperation, and should be critical platforms from which the U.S. as a "dialogue partner" can participate and contribute.



As in past counterinsurgency operations, law enforcement is absolutely essential to defeating this new insurgency. Working with the SEA civilian and military law enforcement agencies the U.S. Departments of State, Justice and Defense must continue to build upon the relationships built since 9/11 in the areas of law enforcement agency cooperation, training and above all the sharing of criminal intelligence to locate and eliminate terrorists, their bases of operations and their sources of financing and support. Such cooperation begins with U.S. sustained participation in ASEAN, and joining the Malaysian sponsored SEA Regional Center for Counterterrorism and the Australian-Indonesian sponsored Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation. In addition, the U.S can facilitate combined law enforcement training through police exchange programs, multinational law enforcement and crisis action training exercises and expansion of international police academies such as the U.S.-Thailand sponsored International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok.<sup>73</sup> To increase cooperation and technical skills, the U.S. can sponsor SEA law enforcement officials in attending professional and technical U.S. law enforcement schools such as the FBI National Academy and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Countering radical Islam provides an additional challenge to the current COIN effort in that it is driven by a religious and political ideology that may not be totally influenced by traditional hearts and minds operations. Although improving security, health, welfare and economic conditions that have caused the frustration and hopelessness that may fuel radicalism; Islamic radicalism must be changed from within the SEA Muslim communities through the moderate Muslim religious and political leaders, community elders and educators. The U.S can perhaps provide incentives and behind the scenes assistance such as developing and improving public educational programs in support of educational reform efforts.

The U.S. can best influence and support Southeast Asia's challenge with the radical Islamic ideology through the information arena. Using information as a weapon is vital in successfully countering the radical Islamic movement. Leaders of the SEA anti-communist counterinsurgency operations knew the power of information in shaping perception, opinions and attitudes and used information operations as a weapon to undermine and defeat the insurgents. On the other hand, terrorist groups wage an information campaign of their own to win the hearts and minds of Muslims.<sup>74</sup>

Leaders in the majority Muslim populated SEA countries struggle between promoting moderate modern Islam and not being perceived by their Muslim countrymen as being influenced by the unpopular West, specifically the United States. With this in mind, in order to help undermine terrorist efforts in SEA, the U.S. role is to create a positive U.S. supporting image, working through SEA leaders to promote a more liberal and tolerant Islam and exposing radical Islamic terrorist groups for their brutality.

The first challenge in helping SEA leaders counter radicalism and terrorism is to reestablish a positive American image among the Muslim populations throughout SEA. As Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon point out in their book, *The Age of Sacred Terror*, "The most ominous sign of the danger ahead is the accelerating growth of anti-Americanism and anti-Western sentiment."<sup>75</sup> For example, a poll in 2003 found that only 13% of Indonesians had a favorable attitude toward Americans.<sup>76</sup> A growing number of Muslims believe that Americans are anti-Muslim and a threat to Islam. The gap between moderate Muslims opinion and Jihadist dogma that America is the enemy of Islam is growing smaller.<sup>77</sup> It is critical that the U.S. continue it's message that America is not at war with Islam and Modernization/Globalization is not Americanization and a threat to the Islamic traditions and values. If we cannot change perceptions and beliefs about Americans then our credibility will continue suffer in the SEA Muslim sectors, which will severely limit our ability

to support and cooperate with our SEA military and governmental counterparts—thus undermining our ability to successfully counter the Jihadist insurgency. This is especially important regarding our relationship with Indonesia and Malaysia.

Equally important in the information campaign is promoting the overall successes of Malaysia in maintaining a moderate and tolerant Islamic country while experiencing modernization and economic prosperity. Malaysia is clearly demonstrating that Islamic countries can successfully participate in the global economy, while maintaining Islamic values, culture and beliefs. The U.S. must exploit its tremendous mass media and communications technology in developing a full comprehensive information operation campaign to support the over all combating terrorism strategy. Our leaders should engage directly with the international media including networks in SEA.

In addition to diplomatic, economic and informational elements of national power, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (COCOM), specifically U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) can play a critical role in supporting the SEA counterterrorism efforts. In addition to our ongoing efforts with the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the U.S must strive to develop stronger military-to-military relationships with Malaysia and Indonesia. The militaries within these SEA countries are primarily internally focused and are highly influential players in the security and stability within the countries. Using the U.S.-Philippine and U.S.-Thailand military relations as a model, through formal and informal agreements and the existing USPACOM Theater Security and Cooperation Program (TSCP), the United States military can train, educate and develop SEA militaries and facilitate professionalizing the military officer Corps. This includes tactical and technical training for developing highly trained special purpose military and police units to counter terrorist groups. The training could also involve training in employing non-lethal weapons and control procedures.

However, the focus should be on instilling values among the military leaders that focus on the security and welfare of the people, integrity, respect for others, duty and selfless service to the country. Also of great importance is the development of a code of conduct and commitment to positive civil-military relations.

The U.S. has experienced enormous success in assisting the Philippine and Thai militaries through programs such as IMET and Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs. Focusing on Malaysia, Indonesia first, such programs should be offered throughout the SEA region to those willing and cooperative SEA countries. The U.S can offer support through participating in joint combined military training exercises. Such exercises not only improve traditional conventional capabilities and build positive relationships; they can directly assist with counterinsurgency military operations against local terrorist groups. Exercises can be conducted within the actual affected areas as has been done recently in the Philippines with the U.S. Special Operations Command and Philippine Armed Forces in the Basilan Island to counter Abu Sayyaf. These cooperative exercises could also be accomplished in other regional hot spots throughout SEA such as Aceh and Poso in Indonesia or in Southern Thailand. The intent of the exercises is to: (1) assist the host nation in establishing security in the areas; (2) deter potential terrorist operations; (3) determine the needs of the local communities and improve conditions and quality of life; (4) build rapport with the local populations; (5) collect actionable intelligence; (6) attempt to cut off resources to the insurgent groups; and (7) if required, seek out to prevent, destroy, or disrupt insurgent operations. Such exercises could lead to better security in the regions, closer cooperation between the military, government and the local populations, as well as, reduce the conditions that contribute to the insurgencies. Also, the exercises will facilitate information exchange and learning between the military organizations, which fosters credible future working relationships.

With improved military relations, to assist in security and isolating the terrorists from the populations the U.S. military can potentially assist with training and advising border security operations, not only along the land borders but also with patrolling the miles of sea-lanes and shorelines of the numerous islands that offer cover, concealment and safe havens for terrorist organizations and cells. This support could take on many different operations including direct combined patrolling or U.S. participation on board host nation vessels as desired by the host country. This assistance could also include supporting increased aerial recognizance and surveillance operations.

In addition to combat and security operations, the military can play a significant role in helping with humanitarian efforts to help the governments change attitudes (win the hearts and minds) of the people and also to restore faith and credibility in the governments and perhaps in the United States. For the past 20 years the U.S. military has not only responded to military conflicts but the nation has asked its military to assist in numerous peacekeeping/stability operations, humanitarian crisis situations, and natural disasters both at home and abroad, including spearheading the December 2004 SEA Tsunami humanitarian relief efforts.

Focusing on specific SEA trouble spots where the conditions are contributing to frustration and unrest such as Aceh, the Southern Philippines and possibly Southern Thailand, if needed, USPACOM can provide a flexible, responsive and results-oriented command and control structure to integrate and manage humanitarian support operations, as well as coordinate interagency, non-governmental organizations and contractor participation. The U.S. military possesses logistical, engineering, medical, aviation, police, fire and rescue capabilities that can be inserted into these troubled areas to assist with initiating humanitarian assistance programs. Military assistance can include engineering projects to create and repair roads, bridges, medical facilities, schools and public utilities such as water and electricity production and distribution centers. They can help

restore municipal, cultural, recreation and religious centers. Military civil affairs personnel can coordinate vital reconstruction and stability efforts within the host nation. Psychological operations resources assist in information operations to increase awareness and knowledge, as well as, influence attitudes and behaviors of not only the enemy but the local populations. As stated earlier this support can be provided to the SEA countries in many different ways, through direct support to the communities or through training exercises with the host nations or through embedded training and advisory teams.

The war against Islamic terrorism on the Southeast Asian front offers the most promising opportunity for curbing the growth and expansion of radical Islam worldwide. Although SEA countries are working toward defeating terrorism and the conditions that foster it, the war is not won. As has been in the past, Southeast Asia security and stability should be a vital U.S. national security interest. The difference is that the radical Islamic movement has replaced communist domination in the region. Just as the SEA communist insurgencies of the past were ultimately defeated, this new insurgency can be defeated using the COIN lessons that defeated their communist predecessors years ago. As such, the United States must continue to influence and support SEA efforts to combat this 21<sup>st</sup> Century threat to the modern world.

## **CONCLUSION**

### **Implications for Countering Radical Islamic Terrorism Beyond Southeast Asia.**

“In the end, terrorism is best defeated through isolating militants from the claimed constituency, demonstrating the shameful and counter productive nature of their methods, and if possible, addressing the grievances upon which they feed.”<sup>78</sup>

Lawrence Freedman

The anti-communist counterinsurgency lessons from SEA, as well as the initiatives currently being achieved by the moderate Southeast Asia governments to counter terrorism, could be applied

to Muslim countries outside SEA. Certainly, the model is useful for current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as the U.S. led coalition forces are clearly attempting to defeat the insurgencies along all ten components of the COIN model. However, the coalitions and host nations continue to struggle with achieving the two most critical steps in successful COIN: establishing security and isolating the insurgents. This shortfall is having a negative impact on the overall success of the counterinsurgency operations in these areas. But as noted in the historical examples, counterinsurgency operations take years to complete. While continuing to conduct our priority efforts in the Middle East, the U.S. has an opportunity to operate on several secondary fronts in the highly Muslim populated but politically and economically weaker countries and regions not only in SEA but Africa and South Asia as well. As Ralph Peters suggests, “we should realign our efforts inward from the edges. Our assets and our energies should be spent where change is still possible or already under way.”<sup>79</sup> From directly assisting and training security forces, and improving critical infrastructure, to providing humanitarian assistance and relief, the U.S. military can play a critical expanded role in countering global radical terrorism. In addition to helping countries internally to fight their growing threats, the U.S. can potentially benefit from changing minds and attitudes about the U.S. and fostering the exchange of actionable intelligence. This effort would require significant participation by the Department of Defense and the geographic combatant commands.

It could be argued that such a strategy will create mission creep and require the U.S. military to become involved in areas that extend beyond its purpose—which is to fight and win our nation’s wars. I would argue that although we may be moving away from the traditional roles and functions of the military, we must defeat this global insurgency and it will require methods that move beyond conventional warfighting. This is simply a new way of doing business by focusing priorities and resources against a new transnational enemy. However, if we accept that the military can provide an

expanded role and capability to the GWOT, we must then also recognize that currently the military is a finite resource. For example, although special operations forces have done a superb job throughout the world, they are simply not large enough to sustain a worldwide comprehensive program. With our primary efforts currently concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reality is that in the near term, perhaps only small amounts of military support to other countries can be achieved. With this in mind, expanded international and coalition support is an absolute must. As outlined in the 9/11 Report, we must rely on a “coalition strategy” that includes Muslim nations as partners in this effort.<sup>80</sup> The SEA countries are emerging as significant coalition partners against terrorism. Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans demonstrate other excellent examples of coalition teamwork in fighting terrorism and directly promoting hearts and minds efforts. Australia’s recent involvement in supporting the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia in combating terrorism provides another excellent example of expanded international assistance. Also, Jordan and Pakistan have contributed greatly as partners in the GWOT efforts.

Concerning the key center of gravity of changing attitudes and eliminating the appeal of radical Islam, there is little the U.S. can do directly in curbing radical Islamic ideology. This must be accomplished within the Muslim community.<sup>81</sup> “Only moderate Muslims have the ability to counter the influence of the radicals, since non-Muslims or secular powers such as the United States do not have enough credibility with Muslims.”<sup>82</sup> However, the United States can continue to encourage moderate Muslim leaders to continue open activities to counter the radical threat and also to continue to promote a theme of tolerance and a message that the GWOT is not a war against Islam by the U.S.

Taking the lead from the Southeast Asia successes, leaders in the Muslim world can publicly criticize terrorist activities as being deviant and contrary to the teachings of Islam. They can reduce support to radical religious schools and establish free public education for all citizens. The



governments should close suspected organizations that support and resource terrorist efforts. They can campaign against radical groups and seek to arrest and disrupt terrorist networks within their borders. Leaders within the Islamic countries, regional organizations, the United Nations and the numerous non-governmental organizations can play a big part in curbing attitudes and beliefs worldwide. The U.S. can support by providing economic incentives, sharing intelligence and providing resources and expertise in assisting with creating public education institutions.

Finally, we must also consider the United States' limitations in influencing a nation's will and its actual abilities to overcome its weaknesses and political corruption. Consider Robert Kaplan's observations regarding the recent USSOCOM support to the Philippines, "I had the distinct sense that the work of the Special Forces on Basilan had merely raised expectations—ones the government in Manila would be unable to meet." Kaplan warns that our COIN efforts may always risk limited success or failure because governments may lack the resolve to do their part or pick up where the United States leaves off.<sup>83</sup> We must remember that the military instrument only provides policy makers with expanded options and resources. History and experience tells us that COIN operations require every instrument of national power and the results will not always meet full expectations and sometimes fail in spite of the very best of efforts.

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<sup>2</sup> Osama Bin Laden, “World Islamic Front Statement: Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” February 23, 1998. Translation from the Federation of American Scientists, November 3, 2004 (<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.html>).

<sup>3</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 58.

<sup>4</sup> Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 209.

<sup>5</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, “Imperial Grunts: With the Army Special Forces in the Philippines and Afghanistan—laboratories of counterinsurgency.” *The Atlantic Monthly*, (October 2005) <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200510/kaplan-us-special-forces>, 1.

<sup>6</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists*. Adelphi Paper 358. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 13.

<sup>7</sup> Ralph Peters, “Rolling Back Radical Islam”, *Parameters*, Vol. XXXII, No.3, Autumn 2002. (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2002) (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/02autumn/peters.pdf>), 13.

<sup>8</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, “Southeast Asia: The Terrorist Threat.” *Asia Pacific Security Outlook*, (Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), 38.

<sup>9</sup> Carlyle Thayer, “Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia” Asia-Pacific Area Network Website, (October 24, 2005) ([http://www.apan-info.net/terrorism/terrorism\\_view\\_article.asp?=&61](http://www.apan-info.net/terrorism/terrorism_view_article.asp?=&61)), 56.

<sup>10</sup> Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973), 172

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 175-177.

<sup>12</sup> Rich Lowry, “Been There, Done That.” *National Review*. January 18, 2005. National Review Online (<http://www.nationalreview.com>), 1.

<sup>13</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 147.

<sup>14</sup> Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973), 276.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 180.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 145-148.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 168-180.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963*. 190.

<sup>19</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. 141.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 184-185.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 207-219 and 230.

<sup>22</sup> Harry Miller, *The Communist Menace in Malaya*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954), 216. Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963*. 212-263. Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. 166-168 and 237.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Clutterbuck, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945-1963*. 190-194. Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. 180-184.

<sup>24</sup> Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*. 232-235.

<sup>25</sup> Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A case Study of Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955*. CMH Pub 93-8. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 83.

<sup>26</sup> Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A case Study of Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955*. CMH Pub 93-8. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 83-86. Robert Aura Smith, *Philippine Freedom: 1946-1958*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 156-157.

<sup>27</sup> Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A case Study of Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955*, 88.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 82-88.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 120-131.

<sup>30</sup> Alvin H. Scaff, *The Philippine Answer to Communism*. (California: Stanford University Press, 1955), vi.

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<sup>31</sup> Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A case Study of Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955*, 88-89. Robert Aura Smith, *Philippine Freedom: 1946-1958*, 37-48 and 172-175.

<sup>32</sup> Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, 89, 98-110.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>34</sup> Leslie Palmier, *Communists in Indonesia*. (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), 85-104, 177-187 and 221.

<sup>35</sup> Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia: Suharto's Road*. (United States: America-Asian Educational Exchange, 1973), 13-14. "The President, it should be stressed, was never a Communist himself—merely a neofascist dictator allied with Moscow and Peking as it suited his interests. Toward that end, he became increasingly convinced that only the Indonesian Communist Party possessed the machinery and mass base necessary to harness and exploit Indonesia's potential and thereby elevate her to the status of a first-class power."

<sup>36</sup> Leslie Palmier, *Communists in Indonesia*. (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), 217-237.

<sup>37</sup> Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia: Suharto's Road*. (United States: America-Asian Educational Exchange, 1973), 46-51, 60. Leslie Palmier, *Communists in Indonesia*. (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), 237-242.

<sup>38</sup> R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 125. Elson states that "perhaps a half a million people had been killed". Arnold C. Brackman, *The Communist Collapse in Indonesia*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), 115. Brackman states that no less than 200,000 communists were slain. J.D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 398. "It is widely agreed that somewhere between 200,000 and 250,000 people were killed."

<sup>39</sup> R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 148.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 160 and 172.

<sup>41</sup> Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia: Suharto's Road*. (United States: America-Asian Educational Exchange, 1973), 22-23.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 23-25.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 28-34.

<sup>44</sup> R. E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 182-183. Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia: Suharto's Road*. (United States: America-Asian Educational Exchange, 1973), 28-34.

<sup>45</sup> Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia: Suharto's Road*, 32-33.



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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>47</sup> R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, 190-191.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 176.

<sup>49</sup> Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia: Suharto's Road*, 35-48.

<sup>50</sup> D. Michael Shafer, "American Counterinsurgency Doctrine", *Deadly Paradigms: Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*, (Princeton University Press, 1988). 116-117. "Under the rubric of winning hearts and minds fall a variety of prescriptions. All, however, address the problems of improving threatened states' performance in three key areas; physical control of territory and populace; penetration of authority throughout the country; and promotion of economic and social development. Thus, the hearts and minds prescriptions amount to three *oughts*. Governments *ought* to secure the population from insurgent coercion. They *ought* to provide competent legal, responsive administration free from past abuses and broader in domain, scope, and vigor. And they *ought* to meet rising expectations with higher living standards."

<sup>51</sup> "U.S. Strategy in the Muslim World after 9/11". Reprinted from *Rand Research Brief*, 2004, pp.1-3. (RAND, 2004), 2.

<sup>52</sup> National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, (Washing D.C. February 2003), 6.

<sup>53</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*. (Washington DC. US Government, 2002). Page two of President Bush's cover letter to the National Security Strategy of the United States.

<sup>54</sup> Ling Wee Lee, "War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World." *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition 2004*. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004), 63.

<sup>55</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. (New York: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd., 2005), 391-395.

<sup>56</sup> Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Local Government Response Against Terrorist Threats in the Philippines: Issues and Prospects." Paper presented at the 12<sup>th</sup> Conference of the East and Southeast Asian Network for Better Local Governments, Singapore, 2-4 December 2004. *Asia-Pacific Area Network Website*. ([http://www.apaninfo.net/terrorism/terrorism\\_view\\_article.asp?id=71](http://www.apaninfo.net/terrorism/terrorism_view_article.asp?id=71)), 4-7.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 19-20.

<sup>58</sup> Rommel C. Banlaoi, *The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia*. (Quezon City: Strategic and Integrative Studies Center, Inc., 2003), 49.

<sup>59</sup> James A. Kelly, "George W. Bush and Asia: An Assessment." *George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment*. (Washing D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 19.

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<sup>60</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, Southeast Asia: “Moderate Tradition and Radical Challenge.” *The Muslim World After 9/11*. (Rand Corporation, 2004), 380-382.

<sup>61</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists*. Adelphi Paper 358. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 37.

<sup>62</sup> Prayono Atiyanto, “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, New York, July 19, 2004.” ([www.indonesiamission-ny.org/NewStatements/ps071904.htm](http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/NewStatements/ps071904.htm)). From a statement by Mr. Prayono Atiyanto, Charge d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations Open Debate of the Security Council, July 19, 2004.

<sup>63</sup> AsiaNews, “Azahari bin Husin, One of the Most Dangerous men in Southeast Asia, is Dead,” 9 November 2005 ([http://asianews.it/view\\_p.php?l=en&art=4578](http://asianews.it/view_p.php?l=en&art=4578)). CNN.Com, “Asia Terror Leader Kills Himself”, 9 November 2005, (<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/11/09/indonesia.terror.suspect.ap/index.html>)

<sup>64</sup> *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2004. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore, 2004), 116-118.

<sup>65</sup> International Crisis Group, *Aceh: So Far, So Good*. Asia Briefing Number 44 (Jakarta, 2005), 1-12.

<sup>66</sup> Eric John, “United States Building on Positive Trends in Southeast Asia,” Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, 21 September 2005, (Us Department of State, 2005)1-16.

<sup>67</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia*, 37.

<sup>68</sup> Christopher S. Bond, “Indonesia and the Changing Front in the War on Terrorism”. Number 875, Delivered on April 15, 2005. *Heritage Lectures*. Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2005), 5. In his April 15, 2005 speech on Indonesia’s efforts in countering terrorism, presented as a model, Senator Christopher S. Bond quoted Malaysia’s Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi comments he made to the World Council of Churches. “Islam Hadhari is an approach that emphasizes development, consistent with the tenets of Islam, and focuses on enhancing the quality of life. It aims to achieve this via the mastery of knowledge; the development of the individual and the nation; the implementation of a dynamic economic, trading and financial system; and the pursuit of integrated and balanced development to develop pious and capable people, with care for the environment and protection of the weak and disadvantaged. Similarly, we have tried to ensure that the rights of women are protected and that they fulfill their potential without having to face artificial barriers constructed in the name of Islam. We know Islam to be just and fair, and that it honors the position and rights of women. But there are clear instances of prejudices being cloaked in religious teachings in the Muslim world, aimed at passing off gender discrimination as the accepted norm. This will simply not do.”

<sup>69</sup> National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, (Washing D.C. February 2003), 1.

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<sup>70</sup> Christopher S. Bond, “Indonesia and the Changing Front in the War on Terrorism”. Number 875, Delivered on April 15, 2005. *Heritage Lectures*. (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2005), 4.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-30.

<sup>72</sup> *The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WT)*. Unclassified Briefing, Version 18 April 2005. JCS, J-5, Washing D.C.: 2005.

<sup>73</sup> Eric John, “United States Building on Positive Trends in Southeast Asia,” Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, 21 September 2005, (Us Department of State, 2005), 1-16.

<sup>74</sup> Ling Wee Lee, “War Against Global Terrorism: Winning the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of the Muslim World.” 65.

<sup>75</sup> Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 469.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 465.

<sup>78</sup> Lawrence Freedman, “Think Again: War.” *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2003), 18.

<sup>79</sup> Ralph Peters, “Rolling Back Radical Islam”, *Parameters*, Vol. XXXII, No.3, Autumn 2002. (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2002) (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/02autumn/peters.pdf>), 8.

<sup>80</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 364.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 375-376.

<sup>82</sup> Angel M. Rabasa, Southeast Asia: “Moderate Tradition and Radical Challenge.” *The Muslim World After 9/11*. ( Rand Corporation, 2004), 409.

<sup>83</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, “Imperial Grunts: With the Army Special Forces in the Philippines and Afghanistan—laboratories of counterinsurgency.” *The Atlantic Monthly*,(October 2005) (<http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200510/kaplan-us-special-forces>), 2.